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Conventionally, customary international law is developed through the
actions and beliefs ofnations. International treaties are interpreted, in part,
by assessing how the parties to the treaty behave. This Article observes that
these forms of uncodified international law-custom and subsequent treaty
practice-are also developed through a nation's reactions, or failures to
react, to acts and beliefs that can be attributed to it. I call this "attributed
lawmaking. "
Consider the new commercial space race. Innovators like SpaceX and
Blue Origin seek a permissive legal environment. A Cold- War-era treaty
does not seem adequately to address contemporary plans for space. The
treaty does, however, attribute private sector activity to nations. The theory
of attributed lawmaking suggests that the attribution renders the activity of
private actors in space relevant to the development of binding international
legal rules. As a doctrinal matter, private activity that is attributed to the
state becomes "state practice " for the purpose of treaty interpretation or
customary international law formation. Moreover, as a matter of
realpolitik, private actors standing in the shoes of the state can force states
into a reactive posture, easing the commercially preferred rules into law
through the power of inertia and changes to the status quo. Attributed
lawmaking is not a new phenomenon but it may have increasing
significance at a time when multilateral lawmaking is at an ebb, lines
between public and private entities are blurring, and the question of
attribution becomes both more complex and more urgent.
* J. Alton Hosch Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. This Article advances a
larger project that explores how business entities shape the content and effect of international laws. For
very helpful feedback I thank Erez Aloni, Sadie Blanchard, Harlan Grant Cohen, Margaret DeGuzman,
James Thuo Gathii, Catherine Hardee, Duncan Hollis, Mary Beth O'Connell, Galit Safarty, Peter Spiro,
James Stewart, David Zaring, and participants at workshops at Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, Notre Dame Law School, Temple Law School, the University of British Columbia Allard School
of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, the American Society of International Law Midyear Forum at UCLA
Law, the Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association in Toronto, and the International Business
Law Roundtable at Brooklyn Law School. Special thanks to Savannah Harrison, Jack Richards, and the
UGA Law Library for research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
When Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, and Google get behind a new idea, the
world takes notice. All three are now entrants in the new commercial space
race.' The result is Blue Origin, SpaceX, and the Lunar X Prize, and,
according to Morgan Stanley, space may soon be a $1.1 trillion industry.2
Yet much of the planned commercial activity may be technically illegal.
The legal question is whether companies may make commercial use of outer
space resources. The answer depends on the proper interpretation of a Cold-
War-era international treaty called the Outer Space Treaty, whose meaning
is contested at crucial junctures.3 The debate about how to interpret this
treaty is unfolding around the world at international institutions, think tanks,
legislatures, and in the popular press.4 Industry presses for a resolution in
favor of commercial use, claiming that uncertainty leeches investment
dollars,' strangles weaker entrants,6 and stymies innovations that could
1. See, e.g., Erin Winick, Get Ready for These Rocket Milestones in 2019, MIT TECH. REV.
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612691/get-ready-for-these-rocket-milestones-in-
2019/ [https://perma.cc/YFD2-WEP3] (reporting on planned launches in 2019 for SpaceX, Blue Origin,
Boeing, Virgin Galactic, and others, including from China, India, and Israel; noting legacy of Google's
Lunar X Prize).
2. Space: Investing in the Final Frontier, MORGAN STANLEY (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.morg
anstanley.com/ideas/investing-in-space [https://perma.cc/FJB8-88KN] (estimating that "the global
space industry could generate revenue of $1.1 trillion or more in 2040, up from $350 billion" in 2018;
predicting that "initiatives by large public and private firms suggest that space is an area where we will
see significant development").
3. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
4. See, e.g., Private Sector Lunar Exploration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the
H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., I15th Cong. (2017) (exploring, inter alia, debate about international
law that applies to private sector lunar exploration); Reopening the American Frontier: Reducing
Regulatory Barriers and Expanding American Free Enterprise in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Space, Sci., and Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., II 5th Cong.
(2017) (same, with an expanded focus on various outer space activities); DIRECTORATE OF STUDIES,
INT'L INST. OF SPACE LAW, DOES INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW EITHER PERMIT OR PROHIBIT THE
TAKING OF RESOURCES IN OUTER SPACE AND ON CELESTIAL BODIES, AND How IS THIS RELEVANT FOR
NATIONAL ACTORS? WHAT IS THE CONTEXT, AND WHAT ARE THE CONTOURS AND LIMITS OF THIS
PERMISSION OR PROHIBITION? (2016), https://iislweb.org/docs/IISL SpaceMining_Study.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HD36-YXP2] (industry group white paper on debate); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Rep. on Its Sixtieth Session $T 227- 37, U.N. Doc. A/72/20 (June 27, 2017), https://undocs.org/A/
72/20 [https://perma.cc/LQ2L-XDAZ] (recording debate between nations in an international forum).
5. See AM. ASTRONAUTICAL SoCY, FINAL REPORT, AMERICAN ASTRONAUTICAL SOCIETY
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS COMMITTEE WORKSHOP ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES
GOVERNING SPACE ACTIVITIES 1 (2001) (recognizing as early as 2001 that space companies need
"predictable, transparent and flexible international and domestic legal frameworks" in order to secure
and protect investments in the new space race).
6. See, e.g., Jeff Foust, Planetary Resources Revising Plans After Funding Setback,
SPACENEWS (Mar. 12, 2018), https://spacenews.com/planetary-resources-revising-plans-after-funding-
setback/ [https://perma.cc/9ZVF-L8LT] (reporting that asteroid mining company Planetary Resources
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solve critical problems on Earth.7 Yet others argue that international space
law unequivocally prohibits extending capitalist resource appropriation to
outer space.8 The debate is entrenched and, for the burgeoning space
industry, existential.
The Article uses the space law debate as a test case for a theory of
international lawmaking I call "attributed lawmaking." The theory asserts
that private conduct can contribute to the formation of uncodified
international law-customary international law and treaty practice-when
that private conduct is attributed or imputed to the state.9 The theory exposes
the relevance of new facts that could (for better or for worse) resolve the
space law debate.o Yet its implications reach far beyond this debate. It
uncovers the potentially disquieting consequence that private business
entities can have a legally sanctioned role to play in creating law in a variety
of areas when the state fails so to do.
Conventionally, customary international law is the product of acts and
assertions of nations that aggregate over time like precedents in a common
law system." When a sufficient number of nations have converged upon a
faced resource shortages and had to start shrinking its business due to the instability of property rights
in outer space, which limited the types of investment vehicles available to the company).
7. See Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the Moon: US. Policy
Options, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 243, 243, 246 (2010) (noting that the major spacefaring nations are
exploring whether they can mine and bring to Earth Helium-3, thought to be present in large amounts in
lunar soil; He-3, light enough to carry in a space shuttle, "is theoretically an ideal fuel for thermonuclear
fusion power reactors, which could serve as a virtually limitless source of safe and non-polluting energy"
and eliminate Earth's dependence on fossil fuels for centuries).
8. See, e.g., Zachos A. Paliouras, The Non-Appropriation Principle: The Grundnorm of
International Space Law, 27 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 37, 50 (2014) ("[A]s a matter of international law, the
appropriation of any part of outer space . .. by private individuals is precluded by Article II of the Outer
Space Treaty. Hence, any state that confers proprietary rights in outer space would commit an
internationally wrongful act , . . ."); Space Law, 54 INT'L L. ASS'N REP. CONF. 405, 429 (1970) ("the
draftsmen of the principle of non-appropriation never intended this principle to be circumvented by
allowing private entities to appropriate areas of the Moon and other celestial bodies"); see generally
Abigail D. Pershing, Note, Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty 's Non-Appropriation Principle:
Customary International Law from 1967 to Today, 44 YALE J. INT'L L. 149, 154-57 (2019) (gathering
sources to argue that the non-appropriation principle was originally intended to be construed broadly
and to unambiguouosly prohibit any appropriation of outer space resources).
9. Existing literatures have observed that non-state actors such as international organizations,
NGOs, and others participate in custom formation by collecting evidence of state practice and opinio
juris, and by crystallizing, formalizing, or urging adoption of various rules. See sources cited infra Part
I.B.2. Others have argued that the conventional account of custom formation should be expanded to
include the practice of non-state actors. See infra Part I.B.2. Unlike those accounts, the Article observes
that non-state actors contribute directly to custom formation when their conduct is attributed to the state,
and that the practice of non-state actors is relevant to custom formation under existing doctrines, not
prospective ones.
10. See discussion infra Part II.C.
11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."); North Sea Continental Shelf
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legal rule through their actions or reactions, the rule becomes binding law, 12
and can be invoked in national and international courts, as well as in
diplomatic contexts.' Customary international law was once the
predominant form of international law, and its importance persists. Indeed,
in an era of nationalist retraction, where major multilateral treaty regimes
are facing existential threats, 14 international custom may be experiencing a
resurgence.1
The conventional account of how customary international law is created
is, however, incomplete.' 6 It does not account for the acts and assertions of
private business entities, which take on lawmaking significance in certain
circumstances.' 7 In particular, the theory of attributed lawmaking asserts
(Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 4,177 (Feb. 20) ("Not only must the acts concerned
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence
of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.").
12. See COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT'L LAW, INT'L LAW Ass'N,
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-10 (2000) ("If a sufficiently extensive and representative number of States
participate in such a practice in a consistent manner, the resulting rule is one of 'general customary
international law' . . . binding on all States."); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art.
38(l)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (requiring that in disputes before it the
Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law"); ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 1-2 (1963) ("The emergence of a customary rule of law occurs where there has grown
up a clear and continuous habit of performing certain actions in the conviction that they are obligatory
under international law.").
13. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (8th ed.
2012) (noting that the existence of a customary rule is determined by "a legal adviser, a court, a
government, a commentator").
14. Harlan Grant Cohen, Editorial Comment, Multilateralism's Life Cycle, 12 AM. J. INT'L L.
47, 48 (2018) (describing current "anti-globalist turns" and suggesting that "multilateralism and
multilateral institutions have a life cycle").
15. E.g., BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 3-6 (2010) (collecting evidence in defense of the assertion that custom is
"playing an increasingly prominent role in the international legal system"); see discussion infra Part
I.B.I.
16. There is an ample literature critiquing the conventional account of customary international
law. Critics have noted, for example, that there is no agreement about how many precedents are
necessary to determine that a customary rule has formed; that custom privileges powerful states with
well-staffed foreign ministries at the expense of newer, weaker, or poorer states; that the two element
approach does not describe how custom actually forms, because governments and courts tend to focus
only on one or the other; or that the approach is problematic as a normative matter. For a brief review of
these and other critiques see Curtis A. Bradley, Introduction: Custom 's Future, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 1, 1-3 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) [hereinafter
CUSTOM'S FUTURE]. This project sets aside these complaints and also assumes for the sake of argument
that customary law forms and binds states in roughly the way the conventional account dictates. Taking
this positivist, formalist starting point, the theory of attributed lawmaking proposes that the traditional
account is nevertheless incomplete in an important way.
17. This is not to say that the doctrine of attributed lawmaking has always been overlooked. As
several readers have suggested, the European colonial trading companies established in the 16th and
17th centuries often held sovereign immunities and exercised power of the state, such as the "national
foreign policy" of the state, and would have likely have had their conduct attributed to the state for
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that when the conduct of a private actor becomes attributed or imputed to
the state under existing international legal doctrines, this conduct counts
among the behavioral building blocks that contribute to the formation of
customary international law. That is, because the private conduct is
attributed to the state, it contributes to the formation of a customary legal
rule. The challenge is to determine when private conduct becomes attributed
to the state. For example, a private business entity can be an "organ" or
"agent" of the state,' 8 or nations can take responsibility for certain business
activity through treaties.19 These principles are not new. What the attributed
lawmaking theory contributes is the observation that attribution for the
purposes of state responsibility also has significant and underappreciated
lawmaking implications.
Space law offers a case study. In the space law arena, it is possible to
argue that private companies are themselves developing the international
law of outer space. They can do this by advancing the legal principles of
their choice-to legislators, investors, and the popular press, and with their
actual rocket launches.20 Under this argument, the behavior of these
companies is itself the "subsequent practice" that determines how the Outer
Space Treaty should be interpreted. 2 ' Because private missions are defined
by the Outer Space treaty as "national" missions, which are attributed to the
home nation and for which home nations are responsible,2 2 these private acts
can also be attributed to those nations for the purposes of customary law
formation and treaty interpretation. This is because when a corporation
whose activity is attributed to the state publicly asserts a legal rule and acts
on it, and a nation does nothing, that nation implicitly accepts the corporate
rule.23 In the absence of direct evidence of a nation's acts and assertions in
support of a customary rule, the actions of private space companies-which
lawmaking purposes. See Ann M. Carlos & Stephen Nicholas, "Giants ofan Earlier Capitalism ": The
Chartered Trading Companies as Modern Multinationals, 62 BuS. HIST. REV. 398, 402 (1988).
18. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) arts. 4(l), 5 cmt. 2, 8 [hereinafter Articles on State
Responsibility] (determining that conduct of a private actor is attributed to a nation for the purposes of
state responsibility when the private actor is an "organ" of the state, empowered "to exercise elements
of governmental authority," or "acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of' the
state).
19. Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium: The ILC's State Responsibility Articles:
Introduction and Overview, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773, 783 (2002).
20. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31 T 3(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
22. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. VI; see also discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
23. See discussion infra Part I.C. I.
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are attributed to the nation-become the best evidence of a nation's embrace
of a particular interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.
The result, the Article shows, is that private companies may be forcing
development of an international legal rule that is permissive to appropriation
of space resources. The Article stops short of concluding that attributed
lawmaking offers a final resolution to the debate.2 4 Rather, it identifies a
potential legal argument that attributed treaty practice on this topic exists
and bolsters arguments that the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit
commercial appropriation.
The theory's implications might be unsettling. Attributed lawmaking
raises legitimate concerns about market actors shaping international law,
and doing so without a deliberative process. It may also exacerbate existing
concerns about customary international law and treaty practice that stem
from their characteristics as uncodified, behaviorally-based law, such as the
possibility of structural inequities, indeterminacy, lack of sovereign
equality, procedural deficits, or legitimacy problems. Moreover, the theory
of attributed lawmaking extends beyond space law to other arenas where
corporate acts can become attributed to the state, such as, potentially, human
rights, cyberspace, and the laws of war, where corporate lawmaking could
conceivably threaten the public interest.2 5 Yet nations are not helpless in the
face of these potential implications. Governments can trump attributed state
practice or treaty practice by asserting their lawmaking authority. They can
generate opinio juris, clarify their treaty practice, or form new international
agreements. In sum, nations retain choices about how international law
develops.
The space law case study suggests that when nations do not exploit the
choice to proactively develop international law, private actors can shape it
instead. The attributed lawmaking theory shows that private actors can
contribute to formal lawmaking by standing in the shoes of the state-they
are lawmakers by attribution. Yet even when private entities do not stand in
the shoes of the state, their assertions and behavior can come to have legal
relevance. When space companies launch, extract, and sell outer space
resources, they force their home states and others into a reactive posture,
increasing the likelihood that their chosen legal principles will prevail and
harden into law. In other words, when private actors assert a legal rule and
24. Indeed, it is not the primary purpose of this Article to resolve that debate. If the principal
goal were to suggest possible resolutions, or perhaps resolutions to which the private sector could
contribute, a simpler method would be to propose a set of principles or other normative guidance. For
example, private parties could formulate a code of conduct, subscribe to it, and urge national adoption.
This Article engages, instead, in doctrinal and descriptive analysis, proposing that the building blocks
for customary international law are already forming in this area, and doing so in an underappreciated
manner.
25. See discussion infra Part IILB.
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act on it, they change the status quo against which states regulate, and
thereby nudge the law in their chosen directions. The story is thus not only
about formal legal doctrine, but also about relative power, and the ability of
private actors to shift international legal rules in their favor.
The analysis builds on and contributes to standard accounts of custom
formation. Those accounts have considered whether non-state actors like
international organizations or non-governmental organizations can affect
the formation of international law,26 and whether armed groups, indigenous
groups, and others should be permitted to do so. 27 The Article identifies the
significance of a different set of actors (business entities) and a different
mechanism of custom formation (through attribution). The analysis thereby
also enriches literatures that examine how business actors participate in
international lawmaking. Existing work in this area examines how business
entities lobby at the national or international levels;28 observe or participate
in multi-stakeholder institutions;2 9 set standards;3 0 contribute to treaty law; 3 1
engage in regulatory arbitrage; and govern their own supply chains
throughout the world.3 2 An analysis of business contributions to uncodified
formal international law-customary international law and treaty practice-
extends this literature in an important and underappreciated direction.33
26. See generally CUSTOM'S FUTURE, supra note 16 (collecting literature); PATRICK DUMBERRY,
THE FORMATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF RULES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 119 n. 12 (2016) (same); LEPARD, supra note 15, at 3-6 (same); S.
James Anaya, Customary International Law, 92 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 41, 43 (1998) (same).
27. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors:
Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 107
(2012) (freedom fighters and armed groups are capable of creating a quasi-custom that should have some
status in international law); Anaya, supra note 26, at 43 (indigenous groups).
28. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age ofGlobalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167,
170 (1999) (conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups); Melissa J. Durkee,
International Lobbying Law, 127 YALE L.J. 1742 (2018) (describing international lobbying).
29. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining Participation in International
Institutions, 8 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 1 (2012) (multistakeholder structures); Kenneth W. Abbott &
Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance:
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501 (2009) (cooperative public-
private mechanisms and projects).
30. See, e.g., TIM BOTHE & WALTER MATELI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION
OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011) (reviewing delegation of regulatory power to
international private-sector standard-setting organizations).
31. See, e.g., Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264 (2016)
(reviewing business contributions to treaty drafting).
32. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000)
(sociological account of regulatory arbitrage); Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, Introduction to THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION, at ix (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (political science
account).
33. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, Reviewing Two Decades of IL/IR Scholarship:
What We've Learned, What's Next, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 626, 631 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack
eds., 2013) (asserting that a review of two decades of international law and international relations
scholarship reveals the "persistent neglect" of custom as a "manifest weakness" of the field).
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A discerning reader may have puzzled over a double meaning embedded
within the Article's title. The title could suggest an analysis of space law,
which is in some sense interstitial. Alternatively, it could concern a law of
the interstitial spaces. In fact, the duality frames the dual ambitions of the
project. On one level, the Article addresses a doctrinal puzzle about
international space law, and specifically about what it regulates. The
question itself has great practical implications for a burgeoning multi-billion
dollar commercial space industry and for whether that industry will have
internationally recognized rights to exploit a common good for commercial
gain. On another level, the Article views international space law as a useful
case study for a larger phenomenon: it uncovers an overlooked method by
which the private sector may be contributing to the development of binding
international law. It is that latter frame which makes the lawmaking puzzle
that space law offers particularly interesting and worthy of consideration by
a larger audience. If binding international law is being developed and forced
by private commercial entities, then lawyers, scholars, and policymakers
concerned with diverse global problems should turn their attention to the
potential and peril of this private lawmaking activity.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I develops the theory of attributed
lawmaking, situating it within conventional accounts of customary
international law formation and treaty practice, and theories of attribution
in international law. Part II embeds this theory in a case study: May private
commercial entities appropriate resources from asteroids, the moon, and
other celestial bodies? The Part considers existing treaty law, new national
laws in the United States and Luxembourg, and the entrenched scholarly
debate. The Part argues that the theory of attributed lawmaking disrupts the
debate by uncovering the significance of a new set of facts-the behavior
of private companies. Part III addresses potential critiques and limitations
of the theory, as well as panning out to consider private lawmaking in a
broader context, as a theory of relative power. In this broader context, the
space law case study shows how private entities make law by thrusting
states into a reactive position and changing the status quo against which
international law develops.
I. ATTRIBUTED LAWMAKING
This Part introduces the theory of attributed lawmaking and places it in
its doctrinal and scholarly context. As a precursor to the case study in Part
II, the Part begins by situating the theory in the context of the new space
race.
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A. Who Makes International Law?
In early 2019, a small Israeli company called SpacelL launched a moon
lander called "Beresheet." 34 SpacelL began working on this mission eight
years earlier in a bid to compete for Google's Lunar X Prize-a $30 million
inducement for private companies to try to land a robotic spacecraft on the
moon.3 5 SpacelL did not win the competition, but it raised money, perfected
its product, and went ahead anyway, launching its lander atop the Falcon 9
rocket made by Elon Musk's flamboyant and ambitious new company,
SpaceX.36
In Hebrew, "Beresheet" means "in the beginning," and, indeed, the
mission was a beginning.37 Beresheet "couldn't quite stick the landing," as
controllers lost contact with the spacecraft just before it crash-landed on the
moon's surface.3 8 But Beresheet nevertheless represents the first ever
privately-funded mission to the moon,39 and its maker immediately formed
plans to try again. 4 0 The story made global headlines, yet also represents just
the tip of the iceberg when it comes to private plans for outer space. With
SpaceX drastically reducing the price of rocket launches, Blue Origin,
Moon Express, Virgin Galactic, and over seventy other commercial space
startups each have their own ambitious projects in the wings.4 1
These private sector activities bump up against fundamental questions
about whether outer space will be subject to the rule of law, or whether it
34. Hanneke Weitering, SpaceX Rocket Launches 1st Private Moon Lander for Israel,





38. Meghan Bartels, Space is Hard, Beresheet Israeli Lunar Crash Proves Again, SPACE.COM
(Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.space.com/israeli-moon-lander-crash-space-is-hard.html [https://perma.cc
/8NMG-Y7KS].
39. Weitering, supra note 34.
40. Bartels, supra note 38.
41. See BMI RESEARCH, MINING FINAL FRONTIERS: SPACE MINING GAINING TRACTION (2017)
(stating that more than thirteen billion dollars has been invested in over eighty space start-ups since
2000). In early March 2019, SpaceX also launched the "Crew Dragon" spacecraft, intended to carry
crews to the international space station, potentially even in 2019. Kenneth Chang, SpaceX and NASA
Launch Is First Step to Renewed Human Spaceflight, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.c
om/2019/03/01/science/spacex-crew-dragon-launch.html [https://perma.cc/7JZM-YKCD]. According
to SpaceX founder Elon Musk, the company's next step is to "focus all of its engineering talent on
building its Mars rocket." Jackie Wattles, SpaceX Launches Its Newest Falcon 9 Rocket, CNN BUS.
(May 11, 2018, 5:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11 /technology/future/spacex-falcon-9-block-
5-launch/index.html [https://perma.cc/2TGE-BHTR]. Meanwhile, last May, Chinese company
OneSpace, a private startup likened to SpaceX, successfully launched a private rocket into space the
first time a private company in China has managed the feat. Michelle Toh & Serenitie Wang, OneSpace




will be a realm of self-help, piracy, and wild west-style appropriation. The
Outer Space Treaty and other Cold War era agreements lay groundwork but
do not unambiguously address a slew of questions settling rights,
expectations, and responsibilities in outer space.42 The agreements do not
offer high levels of certainty to investors. They leave plausible questions
about who may benefit from outer space activities, and if and how those
actors may lay a claim. The stage is set for a new gold-rush: a Silicon-
Valley, dot-com-boom-style race to space.
Private companies are seizing the opportunity this loosely governed
arena presents.4 3 They are working on a number of levels to announce the
legal principles of their choice: lobbying governmental regulators and
international institutions, and, significantly, broadcasting their proposed
legal rules in media interviews, press releases, investor reports, and
congressional hearings. 4 4
When nations assert a legal rule, and then act on it, and a number of
nations converge in their assertions and acts, we call this customary
international law.4 5 Similarly, parties to a treaty can contribute to setting the
meaning of the treaty through their "subsequent practice."4 6 Private actors
are not so empowered as lawmakers. But their behavior is nevertheless
relevant to the creation of uncodified international law-custom and treaty
interpretation-in significant and underappreciated ways.
Little has been said about the role of private business actors in forming
uncodified formal international law, like custom. 4 7 The reason, perhaps, is
42. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
43. See discussion infra Part H.C.2.
44. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
45. See discussion infra Part I.B.I.
46. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, at art. 31 T 3(b).
47. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. By contrast, a voluminous literature considers business
influence on informal or "bottom-up" lawmaking--that is, business roles in setting codes of conduct
and private standards and contributing to "soft" or voluntary international law or international regulation.
See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three
Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 126, 128 (2005) (describing how informal rules
"blossom into law"; these rules are the "creation of private bankers," "public export credit insurers," and
others); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment
Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 56-58 (2014) (describing mechanism whereby the WTO Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement incorporates privately-created international standards); BOTHE &
MATELI, supra note 30 (reviewing delegation of regulatory power to international private-sector
standard setting organizations). An incipient literature also studies business influence on international
treaty-making and, in turn, on formal international treaty law. See, e.g., Durkee, supra note 31; see also
Benvenisti, supra note 28, at 170 (conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups);
Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins ofInternationalAgreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501, 539 (2004)
("Governments may form treaties for many of the same reasons that they enact statutes to achieve
domestic goals."); see generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988) (theorizing that the negotiating behavior of national
leaders reflects the dual and simultaneous pressures of international and domestic political games).
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that in the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the
twenty-first, the international legal community has been focusing on the
possibilities and promise of treaty law.48 Treaties offer the benefit of explicit
agreement, textual clarity, and speed in formation. 4 9 In the post-WWII
context, and especially the post-Cold War context, treaties seemed to be the
highest and best form of international lawmaking.50 But the era of
multilateral treaty-making may now be coming to a close as major
geopolitical rifts divide former allies and seem to diminish the possibilities
for meaningful multilateral agreements."
The new context requires new forms of lawmaking, or old ones,
reinvigorated. It has inspired a bifurcated focus: a look ahead to new forms
of global governance that sideline formal international law, and a renewed
focus on the fundamental building blocks of international law, including
existing treaties and international custom.5 2 But any consideration of these
forms of law is incomplete without a consideration of the corporate
influencers whose global power often rivals that of states. What is their role
in lawmaking?
The space law case study shows that the story of private sector power
over the development of uncodified international law-custom and treaty
In former articles, I explored the phenomenon of international business lobbying at international
institutions. See, e.g., Durkee, supra note 28; Melissa J. Durkee, AstroturfActivism, 69 STAN. L. REV.
201 (2017) (exploring the "astroturf activism" phenomenon by which private entities channel influence
both overtly and covertly through NGOs active within international institutions). Corporate pressure on
lawmakers has, of course, long been a topic of interest within U.S. domestic legal literatures. See, e.g.,
Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign
Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 87-90 (2014) (proposing reforms
that would subsidize lobbying activity by public-interest groups); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-
Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 216 (2012) (proposing a "national economic
welfare" rationale for lobbying regulation); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 118, 121 (2010) (reviewing efforts to redress the "financial vulnerabilities of democracy"); Maggie
McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1199 (2016) (asserting that current
lobbying regulation and practice violates the First Amendment's Petition Clause); Zephyr Teachout, The
Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 4, 6 (2014) (noting that the scope of the constitutional
lobbying right is unclear).
48. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L.
115, 119 (2005) ("[M]odern international relations have made the treaty a more important tool, relative
to [customary international law], than it has been in the past. . . .").
49. Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2012) ("[C]odification
allows states to specify more precisely what customary international law requires, thereby facilitating
deeper cooperation and avoiding costly disputes over vague legal rules.").
50. Guzman, supra note 48, at 119; Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary)
International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 106 (1995) ("[M]ost scholars
consider treaties to be the preeminent method of international environmental lawmaking.").
51. Cohen, supra note 14, at 48 (describing current "anti-globalist turns" and suggesting that
"multilateralism and multilateral institutions have a life cycle").
52. See, e.g., CUSTOM'S FUTURE, supra note 16 (collecting essays considering the future of
international custom).
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interpretation-is a story that unfolds on two levels. On one level, private
entities influence the development of law by nudging states to acquiesce to
their preferred rules. They change the status quo against which any new law
is developed. On a second, and more fundamental, doctrinal level, private
entities can stand in the shoes of the state to create formal law through the
doctrine of attribution. The following sections focus on this second form of
lawmaking.
B. Uncodified International Lawmaking
1. Customary International Law
While much of international law is now made through explicit
agreements between nations, a second form of lawmaking is no less
authoritative.53 Customary international law is uncodified law, like the
common law in the United States and Commonwealth nations.54 It is not the
product of explicit bargains between nations, but rather evolves as nations
consistently follow a particular practice and manifest a belief that they
consider that practice to be legally binding.55 Thus, the standard view of
customary international law is that it arises from a consistent practice of
states, followed out of a sense of legal obligation. This account has been
subject to heavy critique as descriptively inaccurate or normatively
deficient,' 6 but most critics nevertheless conclude that custom's importance
53. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 12, at art. 38(l)(b) (including "international custom" as one
of three forms of international law).
54. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common
Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM's FUTURE, supra note 16, at 34 (developing the theory that "[t]he
application of CIL by an international adjudicator ... is best understood in terms similar to the judicial
development of the common law").
55. Thus, one way to describe custom is as "the generalization of the practice of States," as Judge
Read did in the ICJ's Fisheries case. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, at
191 (Dec. 18) (Read, J., dissenting).
56. The standard account has been "plagued by evidentiary, normative, and conceptual
difficulties, and it has been subjected to increasing criticism in recent years." Bradley, supra note 54, at
34; see generally id. at 341-6 (collecting critiques, including whether custom indeed requires both
elements of practice and opinio juris; how it is possible to discern opinio juris; that there is no standard
as to how much state practice is necessary; how to weigh various evidences of custom formation; how
much evidence is necessary to determine whether custom has formed; whether custom is undemocratic;
and so forth). B.S. Chimni has recently offered an even more fundamental critique: that customary
international law and its doctrines of formation and use have served to "facilitate the functioning of [the]
global capitalist system by filling crucial gaps in the international legal system," in such a way as to
"secure the interests of predominantly capital importing nations"; the unavailability of state practice of
third world nations compounds this problem. B. S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third
World Perspective, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (2018). Other critiques have focused on the utility of
custom as compared with other forms of international law. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 452 (2000) (contending that customary
international law is declining); Joel P. Trachtman, The Growing Obsolescence of Customary
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as a source of international law persists. Indeed, in the words of the
International Law Commission's (ILC's) Special Rapporteur Michael
Wood, "Customary international law remains the bedrock of international
law."5 8
Determining whether there is a customary rule in a particular area is an
inductive practice that requires amassing evidence that nations actually
follow the practice (the "state practice" element), and that they consider the
practice to be law (the "opinio juris" element). 59 Thus, the choice of law
provision of the International Court of Justice provides that the Court "shall
apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law."60
A shorthand way to think about the elements of custom is that state
practice is elicited through conduct, and opinio juris through statements. 6 1
Those statements may come from presidents, prime ministers, foreign
ministers, ambassadors, or anyone else who may speak on behalf of the
nation.6 2 The "practice" to be considered includes both affirmative acts and
failure to act. 6 3 In particular, if one nation asserts a particular legal right or
duty and no nation disagrees, many will count that absence of disagreement
to be affirmative evidence of the development of the customary rule.64 In
International Law, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE, supra note 16, at 172, 174 (noting that many areas once
covered by custom are now codified in treaties); Guzman, supra note 48, at 119 ("[M]odem international
relations have made the treaty a more important tool, relative to CIL, than it has been in the past, and
there are myriad ways for states to cooperate through soft law instruments that fall short of treaties.").
57. See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 20 (2009)
("[T]he rumored 'demise' of non-treaty sources of international law has been vastly exaggerated.. .
58. Michael Wood, Foreward to DUMBERRY, supra note 26, at xv.
59. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27) ("[F]or a new customary rule to be formed, not only
must the acts concerned 'amount to a settled practice,' but they must be accompanied by the opiniojuris
sive necessitatis. . . . [Relevant states] must have behaved so that their conduct is 'evidence of a belief
that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."' (quoting 1969
I.C.J. Rep. 44, 1 77)); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep.
4, T 77 (Feb. 20). Anthea Roberts has advanced a critique that while international legal scholars and
practitioners regularly recite the two-element rule, they have invoked these elements differently over
time. A "traditional" approach principally relied on state practice, while "modern" custom relies more
heavily on expressions of opinio juris. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches
to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757-58 (2001).
60. ICJ Statute, supra note 12, at art. 38(l)(b).
61. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-90, 160
(1971) (offering this distinction).
62. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 697, 698 (1900) (reviewing evidences of
custom).
63. See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 29 (Sept. 7) (considering a
lack of protest to count as evidence of state practice). But cf CRAWFORD, supra note 13, at 25 ("Silence
may denote either tacit agreement or a simple lack of interest in the issue.").
64. See e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 154 (2010) ("[F]or global
custom, silence means acceptance of a new rule."). But cf Kevin Jon Heller, Specially-Affected States
and the Formation of Custom, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 191, 233 (2018) (noting that "[e]quating silence with
[VOL. 97:423436
INTERSTITIAL SPACE LAW
other words, the failure to object will often be considered tacit acquiescence.
Thus, custom forms through both state actions and reactions (or the absence
of reactions).
When determining whether a customary rule has developed, contrary
practice does not necessarily defeat the emergence of a rule.65 It can instead
be considered conduct that violates the newly emerging rule. The analysis
depends on the consistency, uniformity, and density of practice and opinio
juris in support of the rule compared with the incidences of contrary
practice.66
Because customary international law is unwritten, and assessed through
a painstaking process of amassing evidence of practice and opinio juris, it
is more challenging to determine than treaty law.6 7 Now that so many topics
in international law are covered by treaties, some have claimed that
customary international law is becoming obsolete.6 8 However, custom still
serves as an important role in filling gaps in written international law, and
is a primary source of law in some areas. 69 In addition, in cases where some
nations have not joined a relevant treaty regime, but the treaty rules are so
widely accepted that they have entered into custom, those rules bind non-
parties through customary international law. For example, the United States
has acknowledged that it is bound by a number of treaty rules even though
it is not a party to the relevant treaties because those rules have become
binding through customary international law. Prominent examples include
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Vienna
consent is very controversial," but that there is greater support for the principle that silence constitutes
consent in the context of specially-affected states).
65. See CRAWFORD, supra note 13, at 25 ("Complete consistency is not required. . .
66. See id. at 24 ("Complete uniformity of practice is not required, but substantial uniformity
is . . . .").
67. For example, sources of custom may include:
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of govemment legal
advisers, official manuals on legal questions (e.g. manuals of military law), executive decisions
and practices, orders to military forces (e.g. rules of engagement), comments by governments
on ILC drafts and accompanying commentary, legislation, international and national judicial
decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments . . . an extensive pattern of
treaties in the same terms, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal
questions in UN organs, notably the General Assembly.
Id.
68. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 56, at 452 (predicting the decline of custom as a source of
international law); Trachtman, supra note 56, at 172 (arguing that custom is declining because treaties
codify many rules once governed by custom).
69. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW (1989) (showing how customary international law plays a major role in human rights law); Alvarez,
supra note 57, at 20 ("[T]he rumored 'demise' of non-treaty sources of international law has been vastly
exaggerated . . . .").
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Convention on the Law of Treaties. 70 Indeed, some commentators suggest
that custom may be taking on an added significance now, in an era where
treaty law is facing new challenges from nationalistic retractions.i
2. Treaty Practice
Evidence of what nations actually do after a treaty is concluded can be
used to interpret treaty provisions. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties-the legislative treaty that regulates making and interpreting
treaties-provides that treaties should be interpreted "in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."72 Because
international law does not limit treaty interpretation to the four corners of
the treaty, treaty interpreters can consider, together with the context,
evidence of the intention of the parties that arises after the treaty is
concluded.7 3 In treaty interpretation, "[w]ords are given meaning by
action." 7 4 Specifically, Article 31 paragraph 3(b) specifies that treaties may
be interpreted in light of "[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation."7 5 According to commentators this is "a most important
element" 7 6 or "best evidence"77 of treaty interpretation. Subsequent practice
is also "well-established in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."
70. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 424 (2000) (noting that U.S. scholars and executive branch officials
accept that many provisions of the Vienna Convention have entered into custom); Frederic L. Kirgis,
Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 149 n.16 (1987) (observing "the readiness of
international tribunals to accept, as custom, the major substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties").
71. See, e.g., LEPARD,supra note 15, at 3-6 (collecting evidence in defense of the assertion that
custom is "playing an increasingly prominent role in the international legal system"); see also Omri
Sender & Michael Wood, Custom's Bright Future: The Continuing Importance of Customary
International Law, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE, supra note 16, at 360, 369 (affirming that custom is "the
principal construction material for general international law" and "more necessary and important than
ever" (quoting V. I. KUZNETSOV & B. R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A RUSSIAN
INTRODUCTION 77 (W. E. Butler ed., trans., 2009))).
72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, at art. 31¶ 1.
73. RICH-ARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 253 (2d ed. 2015) (noting that the role of
subsequent practice in treaty interpretation "is one of the features of the Vienna rules which marks out
a difference from the approach taken in some legal systems to interpretation of legal texts of purely
domestic origin").
74. Id.
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, at art. 31 1 3(b).
76. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 241 (2d ed. 2007).
77. GARDINER, supra note 73, at 253.
78. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, ¶ 49 (Dec. 13)
(quoting 1966 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 221,T 15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966).
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The rationale for this rule is that parties' actual application of the treaty
rule in practice "is usually a good indication of what they understand it to
mean, provided the practice is consistent and is common to, or accepted,
expressly or tacitly, by both or all parties."7 9 Anthony Aust offers examples
of cases in which subsequent practice has clarified meanings that are not
obvious from the text of a treaty itself, and may even conflict with the
drafters' intent as discerned from legislative history (the travaux
preparatoires).80 Moreover, it is not necessary to show that the particular
subsequent practice is common to all parties, only that the parties have at
least tacitly accepted it."
The practice of parties can also constitute a "supplementary means of
interpretation" under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, in addition to
"subsequent practice" under Article 31, paragraph 3(b), and in this latter
instance it is not necessary to show the agreement of all parties.8 2 In the
ILC's recent work on "subsequent agreements and subsequent practice" in
relation to treaty interpretation, it stated that "[t]he practice of individual
States in the application of a treaty" can be used as "one of the 'further'
means of interpretation" to confirm the meaning of a treaty or to resolve an
ambiguity or absurdity.8 3 Indeed, the ILC has gathered authorities to show
that "any practice in the application of the treaty that may provide
indications as to how the treaty is to be interpreted may be a relevant
supplementary means of interpretation under article 32" of the Vienna
Convention. 84 For example, for the purposes of an article 32 analysis,
international courts have relied on domestic legislation, administrative
practice, judicial opinions, and even reports by technical experts
commissioned by the state.s
79. AUST, supra note 76, at 241 (citing the US-France Air Services Arbitration 1963 (54 I.L.R.
303)).
80. Id. at 242-43 (noting that the definition of a "concurring vote" of the UN Security Council
as enshrined in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter evolved from state practice to mean "not objecting").
81. Id. at 243.
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, at art. 32; see also Subsequent
Agreements and Subsequent Prctice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. GAOR 70th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018), http://legal.un.org/docs/?path =../ilc/reports/2018/english/chp4
.pdf&lang=EFSRAC [https://perma.cc/9MBK-JE3S] [hereinafter ILC Report on Subsequent Practice].
83. ILC Report on Subsequent Practice, supra note 82, at 33 ¶ 23.
84. Id. at 33 T 24.
85. See id. at 33 ¶¶ 26-28, 30 (collecting cases).
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3. Non-State Entities
"State practice" for the purposes of custom and "subsequent practice" in
the context of treaty interpretation are doctrines that look to the state. Under
the conventional view, only the practice and beliefs of nation states have
legally constitutive effects.86 Most scholars agree with this basic
proposition," although outliers exist,88 and there are many nuanced
positions about how non-state actors can contribute to uncodified law
development. 89
A first literature has focused on custom's opinio juris element, and
considers how non-state actors write down, crystalize, and publicize
86. See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, T 27 (June 3) ("It
is . . . axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the
actual practice and opinio juris of States . . . ."); Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary
International Law, With Commentaries, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Seventieth Session, U.N. GAOR 70th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 122, 130, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018)
[hereinafter Draft Conclusions] ("The requirement of a general practice . . . refers primarily to the
practice of States . . . ."); STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 92
(2007) ("Non-state actor contributions are legally irrelevant when discerning customary legal rules.");
Jean d'Aspremont, Non-State Actors and the Formation ofInternational Customary Law: Unlearning
Some Common Tropes, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1,4 (lain Scobbie & Sufyan Droubi eds., forthcoming 2019) (noting that the role of non-state actors
in making customary norms "has never been captured by the modern categories of the doctrine of the
sources of international law").
Some, including the ILC, propse that the practice of international organizations can also be relevant
to custom formation, when they hold lawmaking authority delegated by states. See Draft Conclusions,
supra note 86, at 131 (noting that the practice of international organizations may be relevant to custom
formation when the international organization "exercises some of the public powers of its member States
and hence the practice of the organization may be equated with the practice of those States"). This
position is contested. See, e.g., Jed Odermatt, The Development of Customary International Law by
International Organizations, 66 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 491, 491 (2017) (reviewing debate about whether
international organizations can contribute to custom formation "as autonomous actors in their own
right").
87. See, e.g., Draft Conclusions, supra note 86, at 130 (stating that conduct of actors other than
states and international organizations "is not practice that contributes to the formation, or expression, of
rules of customary international law"); LEPARD, supra note 15, at 186 (defining as one of the
"fundamental characteristics" ofopiniojuris that it is "an attitude among states regarding the desirability
of instituting particular norms as legal norms"); ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 176 (1999) (affirming that "the interactions of nonstate actors with each other
and with states do not produce customary international law" because "[o]nly state interactions can
produce custom"); MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 78 (1999) (arguing
that the concept of international legal personality "impos[es] limits on who can participate in the
customary process," and dictates that "[s]tates are the principal, if not the exclusive, direct participants
in the process of customary international law").
88. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (2d ed.
2003) (asserting that opinio juris "is to be gathered from patterns of generally shared legal expectation
among humankind, not merely among official State elites"); Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing
Customary International Law: The Challenge ofHuman Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 227-34 (1991)
(suggesting that the activity of NGOS can be relevant both to the practice and opinio juris elements of
customary international law creation); Chimni, supra note 56, at 42-A3 (proposing a "postmodern
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particular norms.90 For instance, NGOs may provide evidence of a rule
through "factual investigations into state practice and beliefs." 9 1 By
collecting evidence and articulating the parameters of a supposed norm,
non-state actors contribute to the belief by other states that something is
legally required. That crystallization and publication of a norm can also
provoke reactions by states, which also count as opinio juris. 92 As Brian
Lepard has noted, non-state actors engage in "a dynamic dialogue with
states" about what currently counts as custom, and "the desirability of
recognizing new norms." 93 Thus, non-state actors like the ILC and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are said to have
significantly contributed to the formation of customary international law in
areas like state responsibility and humanitarian law, respectively, through
their codifications of customary norms.94
Second, in addition to articulating what they believe to be current norms
of customary international law, non-state actors may develop sets of
principles they believe states ought to accept as legally binding. 95 For
example, James Anaya points out that because "individuals, independent
experts, and nongovernmental organizations" have obtained "various
avenues of access to international decision making" through international
institutions,9 6 they can come to participate in developing a "normative
consensus" that leads to a quicker development of a norm into international
custom. 9 7 International organizations participate in this process by making
statements and resolutions that can "prompt behavior consistent with that
dotrine" of customary international law that would incude the practice of social movements, civil society
actors, and international organizations which "further[] the cause of global justice").
89. See, e.g., d'Aspremont, supra note 86, at 1 (noting, with perhaps some degree of hyperbole,
that "the contribution of non-state actors to international customary law ... has already been the object
of innumerable discussions and scholarly exchanges over the last decade"). The debate has, however,
tended to be narrowly focused, leaving important gaps such as the one this Article addresses. See
Roberts, supra note 59, at 775 (suggesting that the impact of non-state actors on customary international
law remains "undertheorized"); d'Aspremont, supra note 86, at 2 (claiming that the relevant debates
"have remained chained by certain modes of reasoning and categor[ies] of thoughts which have been
precluding any renewal of scholarly reflection on the matter").
90. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 59, at 775 ("Nongovernmental organizations help to articulate
emerging customs and monitor state compliance with international law by investigating and publicizing
breaches of the law in areas such as human rights and environmental protection.").
91. LEPARD, supra note 15, at 187.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., d'Aspremont, supra note 86, at 19-23 (citing these instances as kindling scholarly
interest in the question of non-state contributions to international law).
95. In this way these actors seek to contribute to the "progressive development" of international
law, or, in the latin, lexferenda (what the law should be) rather than merely lex lata (law as it is). Roberts,
supra note 59, at 763.
96. Anaya, supra note 26, at 43.
97. Id.
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resolution which in turn may result in new customary international law." 98
As Jose Alvarez has observed, international organizations codify, promote,
and urge compliance with various norms they hold out as customary law, as
well as offering a forum for states to communicate their opinio juris. 99
A third observation is that non-state actors also lobby at the domestic
level to persuade states to produce new state practice or manifestations of
opinio juris. As Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin have noted, non-
state actors, particularly NGOs, "can assist in generating state practice by
campaigning in domestic arenas for appropriate statements in parliaments
and other official bodies."'0 0 Corporations can exert similar persuasive
influence by influencing national regulation through lobbying or "offering
investment and threatening industrial migration." 1 '
A separate set of literatures argues that non-state actors should be
permitted to participate in customary international law formation. Anthea
Roberts has proposed that freedom fighters and armed groups are capable
of creating a quasi-custom that should have some status in international
law.1 0 2 Others have proposed that the practice and beliefs of indigenous
communities should be relevant to custom formation.' 0 3 Still others have
proposed that a much broader range of non-state actors such as people
groups and non-governmental organizations should be "accommodate[d]
within the formal structures of international law creation." 1'04
An important gap remains. Specifically, what role do business entities
have in forming custom? Individual business entities, as well as industry or
trade groups, can presumably contribute in many of the ways other non-
state actors do, such as by codifying, promoting, and urging compliance
98. Id.
99. Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 12 (2005).
100. HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 77 (2000); see also Roberts, supra note 59, at 775 ("[NGOs] have an
indirect effect by influencing state behavior and statements through actions such as lobbying and calling
boycotts. They have assisted in setting the agenda for international conferences and participated in the
negotiation and drafting of treaties and resolutions.").
101. TULLY, supra note 86, at 94; Karsten Nowrot, Transnational Corporations as Steering
Subjects in International Economic Law: Two Competing Visions of the Future?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 803, 803 (2011) (transnational corporations are involved in the progressive development
and enforcement of economic law).
102. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 27, at 149.
103. Anaya, supra note 26, at 43.
104. See, e.g., John Tasioulas, Customary International Law and the Quest for Global Justice, in
THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 307, 328
(Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007) (proposing "a role for various non-
state actors, such as international organizations .. . peoples . .. non-governmental organizations .. . and
so on," which would "strengthen the legitimacy of international law"); see also Chimni, supra note 56,
at 43 (citing Tasioulas with approval and proposing that "there is no reason why 'state practice' cannot
include the practice of social movements").
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with norms they hold out as existing customary law, or rules they think
states ought to accept as legally binding. 0 5 Are there any other ways they
can contribute? The area is substantially undertheorized.1 0 6 The attributed
lawmaking theory offers one answer. In the attributed lawmaking account,
it is the behavior of business actors themselves that becomes state practice,
as the next Subpart explains.
C. The Theory ofAttributed Lawmaking
The theory of attributed lawmaking is as follows: When the behavior of
private actors becomes attributed or imputed to the state, that behavior itself
has law-forming implications. The theory asserts that lawyers, judges, and
officials can look to that private activity as among the relevant behavioral
building blocks of an emerging rule of customary international law, or the
"subsequent practice" that helps to determine the meaning of treaty terms.
That is, the private activity can count as relevant state practice. Thus, when
a private actor standing in the shoes of a state asserts a legal rule in national
and international fora, or behaves as though their asserted rule were correct
and openly acts accordingly, that is relevant to custom formation. The
theory has potentially controversial implications, which are addressed in
Part III. This Part is devoted to unearthing its roots in customary
international law doctrines of attribution and the imputation of private sector
behavior to the state.
1. Attribution
"Attribution is the legal fiction which assimilates the actions or
omissions of state officials to the state itself and which renders the state
liable for damage . ."107 Under the doctrine of attribution, the conduct of
any state organ or official "including police, military, immigration and
similar officials" comes to be considered an act of the state under
105. DUMBERRY, supra note 26, at 121-22 (noting that while NGOs and corporations do not
directly contribute to custom formation, they can have an impact by influencing states).
106. Some authors have noted the possibility of attributed lawmaking, but without substantial
analysis. See, e.g., DUMBERRY, supra note 26, at 119 (noting that "[s]tate practice also includes the
conduct of entities . .. who act as defacto organs of the State"); TULLY, supra note 86, at 92 (including
a passing reference to the fact that "[c]orporate activity 'counts' towards the formation of custom only
where private activity is imputable to states" and considering the significance of this in the context of
investment contracts).
107. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 572 (7th ed. 2014).
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international law. 08 States can be responsible for the conduct of their
officials even when those officials act outside of their actual or apparent
authority or contrary to law, and even when the state has no direct control
over those acts. 109 While the activity of private persons, groups, or
corporations are generally not attributed to the state, they can become
attributable in some circumstances.110
Principles of attribution are principally relevant to the doctrine of state
responsibility. When a state breaches its obligation under a primary rule of
international law-that is, a behavioral commitment under a treaty or
customary rule-it commits an "internationally wrongful act,""' which, in
turn, triggers the rules of state responsibility.11 2 Under the rules of state
responsibility, the nation in breach bears the obligation to cease the act that
violates international law, "offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of
non-repetition, if circumstances so require,"" 3 and to "make full reparation
for the injury caused,""1 4 including offering restitution, compensation, or
satisfaction." 5 In other words, a nation must stop the offending conduct and
offer some sort of remedy for the wrong.
It is not only the acts of state officials that can be attributed or
"assimilated" to the state. The International Court of Justice has concluded
that a private actor can be an organ or agent of the state when it exercises
elements of public authority or acts under the government's instructions and
subject to its effective control." 6 According to the ILC's formulation, the
conduct of a private actor is attributed to a nation for the purposes of state
108. Robert McCorquodale, Spreading Weeds Beyond Their Garden: Extraterritorial
Responsibility of States for Violations of Human Rights by Corporate Nationals, 100 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 95, 96 (2006).
109. See id. at 96-97 (collecting sources).
110. See id. at 99.
111. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, at art. 1, 12 (defining a breach of an
obligation by acts not in conformity with what is required); see also Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 1 57 (Sept. 25) (including "failure to comply with its
treaty obligations" a basis for state responsibility).
112. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, at art. I ("Every internationally wrongful act
of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.").
113. Id. at art. 30(b).
114. Id. at art 31.
115. Id. at art. 34. Satisfaction may include, inter alia, "acknowledgment of the breach, an
expression of regret, [or] a formal apology." Id. at art. 37(2).
116. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 400 (Feb. 26) (concluding
that the state can be responsible for non-state actors to the extent that "they acted in accordance with
that [s]tate's instructions or under its 'effective control"'); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27) (developing
the "effective control" test).
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responsibility when the private actor is an "organ"' of the state,
empowered "to exercise elements of the governmental authority,"' 18 or
"acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of' the
state. 119 A private actor's conduct is also attributed to the state when the
state later "acknowledges and adopts the conduct . . . as its own."1 20 The
ILC's rules include, for example, "privatised corporations which retain
certain public or regulatory functions."1 2 1 The ILC commentaries offer as
examples private security firms functioning as prison guards, or airlines
exercising immigration controls.1 22  Finally, private conduct can be
attributed to the state through treaty, as in the landmark Trail Smelter case,
where the governments of Canada and the United States attributed
responsibility for the Canadian smelting plant to the government of Canada
itself.123
While the ILC's formation of the rules offer some clarity, their scope of
application is somewhat contested, as is whether this formulation accurately
characterizes the underlying rules of general international law.1 24 The
United States Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law offers a
broader rule, noting in commentary that "[a] state is responsible. . . for both
its own activities and those of individuals or private or public corporations
under its jurisdiction." 2 5 Moreover, it is a fairly standard feature of
international agreements to require parties to address the behavior of the
private entities under its jurisdiction and control.1 2 6 This kind of obligation
117. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, at art. 4(1). Note that whether an actor is an
"organ of the state" is determined under domestic law. Id. at art. 4(2).
118. Id at art. 5.
119. Id. at art. 8.
120. Id. at art. 11.
121. SHAW, supra note 107, at 572-73.
122. Id. at 573 (citing Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, at art. 5 cmt. 2).
123. See Lakshman Guruswamy, State Responsibility in Promoting Environmental Corporate
Accountability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 209, 218 (2010) (noting that "[w]hat is most important in
this context is that the arbitral tribunal did not attribute the conduct of the Trail Smelter to Canada. The
Convention did so" (citing Trail Smelter Case (U.S./Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965-66 (1941))).
124. See, e.g., Bodansky & Crook, supra note 19, at 783 (reporting that "[t]he Commission was
well aware that the articles on attribution sometimes suggest more precision or concreteness than is
found in the world").
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 601 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
But cf Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, at ch. 11 cmt. 2 ("In theory, the conduct of all
human beings, corporations or collectivities linked to the State by nationality, habitual residence or
incorporation might be attributed to the State, whether or not they have any connection to the
Government. In international law, such an approach is avoided . . . ."). Under a separate duty of due
diligence, a nation bears international responsibility for transboundary environmental harms caused by
activities by private parties under a state's jurisdiction and control. See Trail Smelter Case (U.S./Can.),
3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1905 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
126. See, e.g., Gordon A. Christenson, Attributing Acts ofOmission to the State, 12 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 312, 355-56 (1991).
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often arises in the context of environmental and human rights treaties. For
example, "compliance by states with environmental agreements depends in
many cases not simply on state action, but on the actions of private parties,
whose failure to reduce their pollution . . . may cause a state to violate its
obligations."1 2 7 I have previously called this type of treaty a "persuasion
treaty," because it requires the state to use persuasion-either regulatory or
through softer forms of inducement-to change a private actor's conduct. 128
Generally, however, the broader obligation of the state to ensure that those
within its jurisdiction follow the law is articulated as a separate duty of "due
diligence," which the state may satisfy through making and reasonably
enforcing laws.1 2 9 The behavior of those private entities is not attributed or
imputed to the state simply because the state failed adequately to make and
enforce those laws.
What is particularly unsettled is exactly what are the outer limits of
attribution. A state assumes responsibility for organs and agents, but what
are the agency rules that determine which private entities count as agents?
In a circumstance where governmental functions are increasingly
privatized, which exactly are "elements of the governmental authority"?
And what level of control is necessary for a nation be exercising "direction
and control" over otherwise private acts? Malcolm Shaw notes that the
ILC's rules were formulated "in reaction to the proliferation of government
agencies and parastatal entities."' Others have observed that the lines
between government agencies and private agencies are becoming
increasingly blurry, and understanding when an entity acts on behalf of a
state is increasingly contested. For example, in the context of the
commercial activity exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine, Robert
Wai has observed that existing tests that distinguish between "commercial"
and "non-commercial" are incoherent and virtually impossible to apply.131
Wai has observed that often "interactions between governmental and
business actors are multiple and intricate,"' 3 2 that "an increasing number of
127. Bodansky & Crook, supra note 19, at 783.
128. Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63 (2013).
129. See, e.g., Vellsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, } 172 (July 29, 1989) (stating that the responsibility of a state may arise "because of the lack of
due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by [treaty]"); see also
McCorquodale, supra note 108, at 98 ("[A] state is considered to have an obligation to protect (also
called an obligation to exercise due diligence) all persons within its jurisdiction from violations of human
rights by anyone.").
130. SHAW, supra note 107, at 572.
131. Robert Wai, The Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity and the Boundaries
of Contemporary International Legalism, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE




traditional state functions are being devolved to the commercial realm,"' 33
and that as a consequence, it is often the case that "the sharp separation of
the commercial and non-commercial is simply a fiction." 34 These
difficulties will also pose challenges in the context of attribution of private
conduct to the state, even as questions of attribution take on urgent
importance to scholars and policymakers in areas like cyber attacks. 13 5
Setting aside these difficulties for a moment, the key for our purposes is
that whenever it is concluded that a conduct is attributed to the state, and
the state bears responsibility for that conduct, there are lawmaking
implications.
2. Reactions
A nation has several possible reactions to private acts attributed to it:
affirmation, rejection, or passivity. The three reactions have different
international legal consequences. The attributed lawmaking theory
highlights the implications of each of these responses, and focuses particular
attention on the third option: passivity.
First, consider affirmation. Does a nation explicitly endorse the private
behavior, through passage of a law or regulation, through affirmative
statements, or some other behavior? In this case, while the private behavior
may have caused or provoked this response by nations, it is not the private
behavior itself that serves as evidence of state practice and opinio juris but
instead those responses made by nations. While these acts constitute state
practice and opinio juris even under the most conventional accounts of
custom formation, little attention has been paid to the role of private
business actors in nudging states toward their preferred rules in this way,
and this is a fertile area for further study. Similarly, when a nation rejects
the private actor's behavior, also through passing laws, regulations, policies,
or explicit criticism of that behavior, this reaction is also relevant to custom
formation by expressing state practice or opinio juris. This, too, is
insufficiently studied but formally captured by conventional understandings
of custom formation.
Attributed lawmaking focuses on the third potential reaction: passivity,
or non-response. In failing to actively affirm or deny the non-state behavior
for which it is responsible, a state implicitly accepts it. The private behavior
is in fact imputed to the state. That private sector behavior and the state's
implicit adoption of it are both relevant state practice for the purposes of
133. Id. at 222.
134. Id. at 220.
135. See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, Decentralized Cyberattack Attribution, 113 AJIL UNBOUND
213 (2019) (discussing difficulty of cyberattack attributions and literature proposing various solutions).
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custom formation or treaty interpretation. To understand the content of the
norm the state is accepting, one must look back to private behavior. What
exactly has the private actor asserted to be legal, through its conduct and
statements? This is the relevant state practice for the purpose of custom
formation or treaty interpretation.
Indeed, the ILC has recently explicitly included the conduct of "organs
of a State" and "private actors acting under delegated public authority"
within the definition of "subsequent practice" under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. 13 6 Although the ILC states that "[conduct] by non-
State actors[] does not constitute subsequent practice under articles 31 and
32," that conclusion refers to private conduct qua private conduct, and does
not encompass conduct that is attributed to the state. 13 7
Custom has always been understood to be reactive in the sense that it
forms not just through the actions and beliefs of nations but also through
nations' reactions and failures to react to the acts and statements of other
nations.13 8 Custom forms both through affirmative state practice and
manifestations of opinio juris, and also through responses of other states to
perceived violations of emerging rules. Nations may also fail to object to
the emergence of a rule, and have that failure counted as implicit consent to
the rule, though this is somewhat contested and may only be true in the
context of specially affected states. 13 9 Attributed lawmaking focuses
attention not on the responses of nations to the claims and behavior of other
nations, but on their responses to subnational actors for whose behavior they
are responsible through doctrines of attribution.
In addition to a nation's response to its own nationals, a nation's response
to acts occurring in other nations matters too. If nation A fails to respond to
the overtly law-flaunting acts of private parties in nation B, for which nation
B is responsible, that, too, can be taken as nation A's implicit consent to the
emerging norm. For example, if, purely hypothetically, China were to fail
to respond to the permissive stance the United States takes toward the rules
its private companies are advancing, even while China increases its own
presence in space, China's failure to object could arguably contribute to the
136. ILC Report on Subsequent Practice, supra note 82, at 37.
137. Id. at 14 ("Conclusion 5: Conduct as subsequent practice"); see also id. at 37 (offering
commentary on Conclusion 5).
138. Draft Conclusions, supra note 86, at 140 (concluding that a state's "[f]ailure to react over
time to a practice may serve as evidence of acceptance as law (opiniojuris), provided that States were
in a position to react and the circumstances called for some reaction").
139. CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, at xxv (4th ed.
2011) (identifying the principle that silence may constitute acceptance); Heller, supra note 64, at




hardening of a customary international rule in favor of the rules U.S.
companies are seeking.
The attributed lawmaking theory this Part has developed is descriptive
and doctrinal in that it describes a plausible legal argument that may be
wielded by national officials, scholars, or others who seek to prove that a
customary international legal rule exists or that a treaty should be
interpreted in a particular manner. It is not offered as a prescriptive or
normative account of how international law should evolve.
Nevertheless, some readers will be bothered by the implications of a
theory that elevates private conduct to the status of public law without
subjecting it to a formal process. The fact that this appears to be a doctrinally
sound possibility should underscore the importance of paying attention to
it. This is because it is conceivable that arguments based on attributed
lawmaking will be advanced, and it is also possible to undercut the
significance of this attributed state practice. Governments can guide and
clarify the development of international legal norms by legislating,
generating state practice, rejecting the privately advanced legal rules,
generating opinio juris, and entering into formal international agreements.
Other readers may argue that a theory of attributed lawmaking may not
fully capture descriptive realities. For example, socio-legally oriented
readers may care more about determining to which forms of state practice
national or international officials actually appeal, rather than trying to
reconcile legal doctrines to determine what counts formally as international
custom. In other words, which sources do legal officials gather when they
are trying to prove a legal rule? However, because international lawyers and
officials consistently use doctrinal reasoning in arguing for particular
outcomes, even the plausibility or theoretical availability of a particular
argument should be a matter of socio-legal interest. These and other
potential objections will be considered at greater length in Part III. To do
them justice requires further developing the attributed lawmaking theory.
The following Part undertakes that task by examining the case law space
study.
II. CASE STUDY: COMMERCIAL USES OF SPACE RESOURCES?
The theory of attributed lawmaking describes a potential legal argument
with the power to shape the development of various international legal rules.
This Part considers the theory through the lens of commercial uses of space
resources. The case study is particularly useful in that it allows the reader to
set to one side the complicated and contested law of attribution of state
responsibility over private acts. In this instance it is not necessary to resort
to background rules of general international law to determine for what non-
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state acts a nation has responsibility, because those issues are resolved by
treaty. The case study therefore offers a simplified arena in which to
describe the theory and to surface its implications about the role of private
entities in the development of international law.
A. The Problem
May private commercial entities appropriate resources from asteroids,
the moon, and other celestial bodies? The question is both important and
unresolved. A settled answer would determine the prospects of a
burgeoning, billion-dollar industry that currently rests on an unstable legal
foundation, and it would determine who has a right to benefit from those
resources. 140
1. The Facts
In the decade since SpaceX successfully launched its Falcon 1 rocket and
"ignited a new space industry," that industry has developed briskly,
featuring many new entrants, "disruptive . . . technolog[ies], business
model[s, and] service design[s]."l 4 1 One important aim of the industry is
mining for useful resources. Asteroid mining companies like Planetary
Resources and Deep Space Industries seek to gather precious metals like
iron, nickel, cobalt, and perhaps the extremely precious platinum-group
metals. 142 They hope to facilitate the project by extracting asteroid water
and transforming it into rocket fuel. 143 Moon Express, iSpace, and a spate
of other companies 4 4 are making plans to mine for resources on the moon,
potentially to include helium-3, said to hold the potential to end human
140. See, e.g., Jeff Foust, Virgin Signs Agreement with Saudi Arabia for Billion-Dollar
Investment, SPACENEWS (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.space.com/38596-virgin-signs-agreement-with-
saudi-arabia-for-billion-dollar-investment.html [https://perma.cc/74GD-GZBR] (announcing an
agreement whereby Saudia Arabia's sovereign wealth fund agreed to invest $1 billion into Virgin's
space ventures); Jeff Foust, Space Ventures Raise Nearly $1 Billion in First Quarter of 2018, Led by
SpaceX, SPACE.COM (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.space.com/40296-space-ventures-raise-nearly-1-billi
on-in-first-quarter-of-2018-led-by-spacex.htmI [https://perma.cc/MB8S-PRM6] ("[T]here was $975.8
million in non-government equity investment in space companies in the first quarter of 2018. That would
put the industry on a pace for nearly $4 billion for the year . . . .").
141. Joel Wooten, A Decade of Commercial Space Travel What's Next?, CONVERSATION (Sept.
27, 2018, 4:24 PM), https://theconversation.com/a-decade-of-commercial-space-travel-whats-next-103
405 [https://perma.cc/38LD-5U8U].
142. Mike Wall, Asteroid Mining May Be a Reality by 2025, SPACE.COM (Aug. I1, 2015), https://
www.space.com/30213-asteroid-mining-planetary-resources-2025.html [https://perma.cc/E79J-9G87].
143. Id.
144. Mike Wall, Moon Rush: These Companies Have Big Plans for Lunar Exploration,
SPACE.COM (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.space.com/39398-moon-rush-private-lunar-landings-future.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/LT8R-JWRW].
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dependence on fossil fuels.'4 5 Potential other finds on the moon could
include rare earth elements like uranium and thorium.1 4 6 These projects now
seem more possible than ever. According to one commentator, a new
"vibrant private sector consists of scores of companies working on
everything from commercial spacecraft and rocket propulsion to space
mining and food production."l47 Groundbreaking technological innovations
like reusable rockets and successful asteroid landings have become
realities.1 4 8 "The next step is working to solidify the business practices and
mature the industry," 4 9 for which commercial space companies seek a
stable regulatory environment.150 Others fear a race for space resources and
seek clearer guidance on how these resources are to be governed, or wish to
clarify that outer space resources are beyond the reach of commercial
exploitation.
2. Contested Treaty Law
The two treaties most relevant to questions about the commercial use of
outer space resources are the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty.
i. The Outer Space Treaty
The broadly-supported Outer Space Treaty' 5 ' binds 107 nations,
including all of the "principal space powers," and is widely considered
145. Wooten, supra note 141.
146. Leonard David, Is Moon Mining Economically Feasible?, SPACE.COM (Jan. 7, 2015), https://
www.space.com/281 89-moon-mining-economic-feasibility.html [https://perma.cc/GRB7-MEXN].
147. Wooten, supra note 141.
148. See Space: Investing in the Final Frontier, supra note 2 (reviewing current space projects).
149. Wooten, supra note 141.
150. Wall, supra note 142 ("From a lawyer's interpretation, I think the landscape is clear enough.
But from an international aspect, and some investors-I think they would like to see more certainty."
(quoting a representative of Deep Space Industries)). The American Astronautical Society (AAS)
affirmed as early as 2001 that "for private entities and investors to expand their business models and to
reach for the next new application, they will need to see predictable, transparent and flexible
international and domestic legal frameworks." Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law. Its Cold War
Origins and Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041, 1052 (2004) (quoting
AM. ASTRONAUTICAL Soc'Y, supra note 5, at 1). The report lists a number of important applications of
commercial space activities, such as "satellite telephony, direct-to-home television, high-speed Internet
connectivity, telemedicine, distance learning, remote sensing of the Earth, global positioning and
navigation and materials processing." Id. In the eighteen years since that pronouncement, both
commercial applications in space and private-sector ambition have exponentially expanded. However,
the lack ofa clear international legal answer to whether and how off-earth resources can be appropriated
still chills investment and innovation in this sector. Bilder, supra note 7, at 248. Moreover, any attempt
by a private entity to acquire and bring to Earth significant quantities of an outer space resource could
lead to conflicts. Id
151. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. VI. As Joanne Gabrynowicz observes, "[t]he speed
with which the international community established this treaty regime demonstrates a clear intent that
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international space law's "charter." 15 2 The treaty entered into force in 1967
and continues to be the most authoritative source of law governing outer
space activities half a century later.15 3 The treaty was passed during the
height of Cold War bipolarity, and it responds to the issues of the era. In
particular, it sought to preserve space as a peaceful, non-militarized realm
that could not be claimed by either of the Cold War powers or their proxies.
The focus of the treaty is to bring space exploration within the UN Charter's
prohibition on the threat or use of force and ensure that nations pursue the
"common interest of all mankind" in their activities there.1 5 4 To that end,
Article IV provides that "[t]he moon and other celestial bodies shall be used
by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes," and
no party may establish military bases, conduct weapons testing, or station
weapons in outer space.155 Astronauts are to be regarded as "envoys of
mankind," and are to be assisted by all, 1 56 and parties are to be "guided by
the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance."' 5 7 Passed a decade
after the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik, the implicit aim of this treaty is
to avoid extending the Cold War to outer space, or inadvertently turning it
hot. 158
Because the Outer Space Treaty was negotiated by two antagonistic
superpowers at a time when forming agreements was challenging, it leaves
many questions unanswered. Moreover, because the purpose of the Outer
Space Treaty was to avoid militarization and colonization of outer space,
the treaty does not offer clear answers to many of the questions posed by
new commercial uses of space. For example, there is no specific answer to
whether commercial entities can appropriate, mine, possess, or sell outer
space resources.
One relevant provision is Article II, which provides that "[o]uter space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
space was to be governed by international law." Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and
Counting: The Evolution of U.S. National Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV.
L. & POL'Y REv. 405, 422 (2010).
152. Bilder, supra note 7, at 257.
153. Id.; see also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. IV.
154. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at pmbl.
155. Id. at art. IV.
156. Id. at art. V.
157. Id at art. IX.
158. BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION, AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, STATE.Oov, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181. hm [http
s://perma.cc/U 2QD-B27F] (reporting that the Outer Space Treaty was a .'nonarmament' treat[y],"




any other means."1 5 9 Additionally, Article I provides the corollary:
exploration and use "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind."1 60 While
Article II focuses on national appropriation, the treaty does anticipate some
sort of activity by non-governmental actors. Article VI provides that States
Parties will be responsible for "national activities in outer space ... whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities."1 6 1 States Parties are also responsible for ensuring
that these agencies and entities comply with treaty provisions, and nations
themselves bear liability for any damage.1 6 2 Any non-governmental
activities must be authorized and supervised by the relevant nation-state.1 6 3
Subpart II.A.3 explores competing interpretations of these provisions in the
context of commercial mining.
ii. The Moon Treaty
The Moon Treaty is also relevant to the questions of whether private
commercial parties can engage in mining activities in outer space.1 6 4 While
the Moon Treaty entered into force in 1984, it has been ratified by only
eighteen countries, none of which are engaged in spacefaring activities.1 65
Because the Treaty does not bind any non-party, it has arguably limited
relevance. Nevertheless, some scholars have argued that its provisions
should be used to interpret ambiguous provisions in the Outer Space Treaty.
For that reason, it merits a brief treatment here. The Moon Treaty was meant
to cover not just the moon but "other celestial bodies within the solar
system." 6 6 Like the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty includes a
number of provisions providing for peaceful use of the moon and forbidding
hostile acts, military installations, and other non-peaceful uses. In addition,
it includes provisions that quite unambiguously prohibit appropriation,
159. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II.
160. Id. at art. I.
161. Id. at art. VI.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec.
5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July IH, 1984) [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
165. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on the Status
of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2019, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/2019/CRP.3 (2019). Moon Treaty parties include Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Chile, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, The Philippines,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. Notably, India has signed but has not ratified the
treaty. Id. The Moon Treaty was developed by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space and opened for signature in 1979. Id.
166. Moon Treaty, supra note 164, at art. I 1 1.
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going further than the Outer Space Treaty in providing that "[tihe
exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all mankind and
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries."l 6 7
Indeed, it provides that "[t]he moon and its natural resources are the
common heritage of mankind" and "[t]he moon is not subject to national
appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means."1 6 8
The Moon Treaty gives parties mining rights for the purpose of scientific
investigation. They "have the right to collect on and remove from the moon
samples of its mineral and other substances" to be used for scientific
purposes or for the support of missions in pursuit of those scientific
investigations. 16 9 However, the Moon Treaty appears to explicitly disavow
any potential property rights:
Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part
thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any
State, . . . national organization or non-governmental entity or of any
natural person. The placement of personnel, space vehicles,
equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the
surface of the moon . .. shall not create a right of ownership over the
170
surface or the subsurface of the moon ....
Instead, the treaty envisions the development of an international regime
that would oversee "[t]he orderly and safe development of the natural
resources of the moon," and management and "expansion of opportunities
in the use of those resources."'7 1 Pointedly, the anticipated international
regime would oversee an "equitable sharing by all States Parties in the
benefits derived from those resources."172
Together, the provisions of the Moon Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty
serve as the principal international legal rules that govern commercial
mining on asteroids or the moon. The next sections examine the debate
among scholars and lawmakers about what these provisions mean for
commercial mining projects.
3. The Interpretive Debate
The provisions of the Outer Space Treaty are ambiguous at critical
points, and the Moon Treaty does not bind most nations. What then is the
167. Id. at art. 4 1 1.
168. Id. atart. II M 1-2.
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nature and extent of the legal commitments that bind space-faring nations
and their private companies? In particular, may these countries or their
companies appropriate property in outer space?
Debate abounds. As one commentator notes, these arguments "have
played out in public hearings, academic journals, space-focused podcasts,
and the popular press."173 Both sides invoke the Outer Space Treaty's
language and context. 174
i. Common Grounds Non-Appropriation Principle
As a starting point, the Outer Space Treaty clearly forbids "national
appropriation" of outer space resources. 17 5 There is no serious debate about
the binding nature of this prohibition or whether it binds all space-faring
parties. 176 In addition, most commentators agree that the non-appropriation
principle has attained the status of a customary rule of international law, and
so binds even non-parties to the treaty.177 One commentator calls this the
"grundnorm" or foundational principle of international space law.'17  Debate
centers on the meaning and scope of that non-appropriation principle.
173. Julie Randolph, Fly Me to the Moon and Let Me Mine an Asteroid: A Primer on Private
Entities'Rights to Outer Space Resources, DRI FOR DEF., Dec. 2017, at 41, 45 (collecting sources). This
area has also been of keen recent interest to law students, who are leading the academic literature in
considering the significance of private sector activities in outer space. For a sampling of the dozens of
notes on this debate, see, for example, Amanda M. Leon, Note, Mining for Meaning: An Examination
of the Legality of Property Rights in Space Resources, 104 VA. L. REV. 497, 497 (2018) (concluding
that U.S. legislation "abrogates the United States' international obligations . . . [and] fails to achieve its
goal of providing the private space industry with the legal certainty it . . . requires"); Alison Morris,
Note, Intergalactic Property Law: A New Regime for a New Age, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1085
(2017) (considering whether national regulation granting private companies property rights in outer
space resources is consistent with the Outer Space Treaty); Stephen DiMaria, Note, Starships and
Enterprise: Private Spaceflight Companies' Property Rights and the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act, 90 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 415 (2016) (same); Thomas R. Irwin, Note, Space Rocks:
A Proposal to Govern the Development of Outer Space and Its Resources, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 217 (2015)
(evaluating current law and proposing a new international treaty on this topic); Austin C. Murnane, Note,
The Prospector's Guide to the Galaxy, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 235 (2013) (considering whether
national and international laws apply to outer space resources); Blake Gilson, Note, Defending Your
Client's Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1367 (2011) (considering Outer Space Treaty interpretation in context of property law principles); Kelly
M. Zullo, Note, The Need to Clarify the Status of Property Rights in International Space Law, 90 GEO.
L.J. 2413 (2002) (focusing on the Outer Space Treaty).
174. See sources cited supra note 173.
175. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 11.
176. See Bilder, supra note 7, at 257 (noting that the Outer Space Treaty binds all "principal space
powers"); see also Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 165 (listing ratifications to
the Outer Space Treaty).
177. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An
Instrument Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT'L L. 563, 581-82 (2016) (characterizing the non-
appropriation principle as unchallenged).
178. Paliouras, supra note 8, at 54.
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ii. Does Non-Appropriation Apply to Private Parties?
One debate considers to whom the prohibition on appropriation is
directed. Does the treaty prohibit only national appropriation but permit
appropriation by private parties?
Those answering this question in the affirmative have access to a strong
textual argument. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty specifically
references "national" appropriation.17 9 The context surrounding that appears
to confirm that the prohibition of "national" appropriation is directed at
nations, as only a nation could have a legitimate "claim of sovereignty." 180
Moreover, "occupation" refers to old international legal doctrines that once
allowed nations to claim territory based on occupation. The historical
context within which the treaty was drafted supports this position, as the
concern of the time was colonization, not commercial use of space
resources. As for private parties, they are specifically anticipated by the
treaty: Article VI states that States Parties bear international responsibility
for activities by "non-governmental entities" as well as governmental
agencies.' 8 1 The fact that they are anticipated by the treaty but not included
in the Article II prohibition on appropriation suggests that the treaty
intended to prohibit only national appropriation of outer space resources.18 2
Those claiming that the treaty prohibits both national appropriation and
appropriation by private parties can marshal their own textual argument.
Article VI defines "national activities in outer space" to include both
"activities . .. carried on by governmental agencies" and those carried on
by "non-governmental entities." 8 3 This definition of "national" must
inform Article II's prohibition on "national" appropriation and thus extend
to a nation's citizens and commercial entities as well as governmental
activities. Moreover, a contrary interpretation defies logic: if nations
themselves may not claim property rights to outer space objects, they have
no power to confer those rights on their nationals.184
179. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II.
180. Id.
181. Id. at art. VI.
182. VIRGILIU POP, WHO OWNS THE MOON?: EXTRATERRESTRIAL ASPECTS OF LAND AND
MINERAL RESOURCES OWNERSHIP 63 (2009).
183. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. VI.
184. Leslie I. Tennen, Enterprise Rights and the Legal Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space
Resources, 47 U. PAC. L. REv. 281, 288 (2016) ("State recognition of claims to extraterrestrial property
by its nationals is national appropriation 'by any other means' prohibited by Article II, no matter what
euphemistic label is employed to mask the obvious.").
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iii. What Is Meant by "Appropriation" and "Use"?
A second debate concerns the meaning of "appropriation." Does it
prohibit mining activities, or does it relate only to the staking out of real
property in fee simple ownership structures-such as plots of land on the
moon, or entire asteroids?
The argument that the Outer Space Treaty prohibits only real property
claims and not claims to resources distinguishes between "appropriation"
and "use." Both the preamble of the Treaty and a number of articles
anticipate that nations and their non-governmental entities will engage in
"exploration and use" of outer space and celestial bodies."' This
exploration and use is to be free to all states,1 86 performed in accordance
with other principles of international law,'87 for peaceful purposes,' 8 8 and
"guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance."' 89
Nowhere is "use" defined, but the term cannot be coextensive with
"exploration," and it must refer to something. It follows that the treaty
anticipates that nations and their non-governmental entities must be able to
"use" space resources in some fashion, notwithstanding the non-
appropriation provision in Article I.
One potential way to distinguish "appropriation" and "use," some
scholars propose, is to consider the terms in the context of enterprise rights.
As Leslie Tennen observes, "[lt]he ownership of a physical location is not
an invariable and necessary requirement for the commercial use of
resources." 90 Rather, a variety of enterprises do not require a claim of fee
simple ownership, such as "grazing leases for livestock, harvesting of
lumber, and extraction of oil" from offshore oil platforms.' 9' "Use" of
resources does not require appropriation of property, but can instead be
185. E.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at pmbl. (emphasis added) ("Recognizing the
common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes .... ).
186. Id. at art. I.
187. Id. at artIll.
188. Id. at art. IV.
189. Id. at art, IX.
190. Leslie I. Tennen, Towards aNew Regime for Exploitation ofOuter Space Mineral Resources,
88 NEB. L. Rev. 794, 799 (2010); cf Bilder, supra note 7, at 268 n.95 (noting legislative debates in the
U.S. concerning whether anything in the Moon Treaty should be construed as a "threat to the free
enterprise system" or "rule[] out exploitation of lunar resources by private companies" (citing Nathan
C. Goldman, The Moon Treaty: Reflections on the Proposed Moon Treaty, Space Law, and the Future,
in PEOPLE IN SPACE: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR A "STAR WARS" CENTURY 140, 144, 148 (James
Everett Katz ed., 1985))).
191. Tennen, supra note 190, at 799 (footnotes omitted).
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based on a right to engage in a particular enterprise-"'enterprise rights,'
not ownership rights."' 9 2
Others disagree. A contrary position is that "use" must be read in the
context of provisions in the treaty that state that "[tihe exploration and use
of outer space . . . shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of
all countries."' 9 3 Requiring that all countries must benefit from any "use"
suggests that "use" cannot refer to commercial benefit, but instead to
scientific uses that can benefit all.
iv. Does the Moon Treaty Help?
While the Moon Treaty has a number of provisions that may assist in
determining whether commercial use of the Moon's natural resources is
legally permissible, the treaty's authority is contested because it has not
been ratified by any nations currently engaged in space activities. For this
reason, debates about the Moon Treaty extend not just to the meaning of its
provisions but also to their legal effects.
Several provisions of the treaty appear to clearly outlaw the possibility
of commercial mining activities on the Moon.1 9 4 In particular, the Moon
Treaty goes further than the Outer Space Treaty by specifying what may not
be appropriated: "[n]either the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor
any part thereof or natural resources in place," and by whom: "any State ...
national organization or nongovernmental entity or . . . any natural
person."' 9 5 The Moon Treaty anticipates that an international regime will
govern any exploitation of natural resources.' 9 6 Under this anticipated
regime, nations are to inform the United Nations, the public, and the
scientific community of any natural resources they may discover;' 97 the
regime will coordinate "development" and "rational management" of those
resources; and it will ensure "[a]n equitable sharing by all States Parties in
the benefits derived from those resources."' 9 8
The Moon Treaty seems to unambiguously foreclose the possibility of
commercial mining on the Moon. Nevertheless, it does offer some fodder
192. Tennen, supra note 184, at 285 (footnote omitted).
193. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 1.
194. Like the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty provides that the Moon "is not subject to
national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other




198. Id. at art. 11 17 (also noting that the sharing regime should be conducted with particular




for debate. The treaty anticipates some manner of "use" of the Moon, and
the "equitable sharing" provision anticipates some sort of benefit to be
derived from it.199 How these benefits are to be shared is not clarified, but
various possibilities seem available: perhaps, for example, some sort of tax
could be levied on the profits of space mining and distributed "on a basis of
equality." 2 0 0 The Moon Treaty has also provoked debate by invoking the
"common heritage" principle. 2 0 ' Some claim that the common heritage
principle requires that any resources must be appropriated and managed
"under the aegis of an international organization controlled by a majority of
nations,"20 2 while others assert that the principle merely requires "some
sharing among all nations of the benefits of such 'common heritage'
resources."'
203
Debate about the Moon Treaty extends not just to the meaning of its
provisions but also to its relevance to international law. There are three
principal positions. The first is that the Moon Treaty is irrelevant since it
has been ratified by so few nations, none of which are currently involved in
space activities.20 4 In other words, the treaty only binds nations who do not
engage in the conduct it regulates. A second position is that the Moon Treaty
is relevant to international law in that it helps interpret the meaning of
ambiguous provisions in the Outer Space Treaty. It constitutes "a
reinforcement, spelling-out, or agreed interpretation by the space powers
and many other concerned states . . . of a number of principles and
obligations already contained or implicit in the Outer Space Treaty."2 05
More specifically, it could either be evidence of "an emerging body of
customary lunar law," because it is the product of a long process of careful
negotiation by space powers, or it may exert some sort of normative force
as "the most sensible and viable rules for the conduct of activities on the
Moon." 2 06 A third available position is that the Moon Treaty is relevant to
the interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty, but as evidence of a rejection
of the principles it elaborates. The argument would assert that the fact that
no space powers adopted the treaty is evidence that they do not agree with
199. Id. at art. 11 4 (providing that "States Parties have the right to exploration and use of the
moon without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality" and pursuant to international law).
200. Id.
201. Id. at art. 11 I ("The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind. . . .").
202. Bilder, supra note 7, at 265.
203. Id. at 266 (also noting that this position asserts that "there should be particular concern for
the protection of the environment in areas regarded as the 'common heritage').
204. Id. at 269 ("Arguably, the agreement should be given little weight as evidence of developing
customary law, since, in contrast to other 'space law' agreements . . . the Moon Agreement has, over a
considerable period, gained few adherents, none of which are signifigant space powers.").
205. Id.
206. Id. at 269-70.
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the treaty's approach. The rejection is itself subsequent practice that can
help interpret ambiguous provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.
B. Potential Solutions
The international community could definitively resolve the debate by
adopting a new multilateral space law treaty that would clarify and elaborate
the law. Such a treaty could update international space law for the new
realities of commercial plans for outer space and the new technological
capacities that have developed since 1967. The new treaty could explicitly
supersede the Outer Space Treaty or, alternatively, parties could amend the
Outer Space Treaty to clarify the meaning of certain provisions like the
prohibition on national appropriation of celestial resources.
However, thus far there have been no major attempts by nations to
negotiate such a treaty. Indeed, the early twenty-first century is not an era
of institution-building. Developing a major new agreement to elaborate
legal rules in the space law context would present serious, and perhaps
insurmountable geopolitical challenges.
C. The Role of Subsequent Practice
The wealth of scholarship on potential interpretations of the Outer Space
Treaty focuses almost exclusively on "the ordinary meaning . . . [of] the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." 2 0 7 Some have looked to the preparatory work of the treaty
(travaux preparatoires). An underexplored way to confirm the treaty's
meaning is to consider, "together with the context," the subsequent practice
of states and the evolution of customary international law in the over fifty
years since the treaty entered into force. 2 08 https://perma.cc/FJV8-SZ6J
As described earlier, treaties may be interpreted in light of "[a]ny
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." 2 0 9 Thus, when parties
converge in their practice in a way that suggests agreement regarding a
treaty's interpretation, that practice can inform the interpretation of a treaty
207. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, at art. 311 1.
208. DIRECTORATE OF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 27. While legal scholarship has generally lagged
behind, the International Institute of Space Law, an international non-governmental organization
dedicated to "fostering the development of space law," Introduction, INT'L INST. OF SPACE L., https://
iislweb.org/about-the-iisl/introduction/ [https://perma.cc/FJV8-SZ6J], recently commissioned a
background paper on this topic that does consider subsequent practice. DIRECTORATE OF STUDIES, supra
note 4, at 35-41.
209. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, at art. 31 T 3(b).
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term. Custom can also be relevant to the interpretation of a treaty when a
treaty leaves a gap in the law. Together with a treaty's context and the
subsequent practice of its parties, interpreters may consider "[a]ny relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties,"
including subsequent treaty law and customary international law. 2 10
There is state practice that is relevant to the interpretation of the Outer
Space Treaty. Specifically, legislatures in the United States and
Luxembourg have tried to use national law to simply legislate away the
international ambiguity. 2 1 1 In the United States, the U.S. Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (the Space Act) explicitly granted to
private parties rights in asteroid resources:
A United States Citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be
entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including
to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space
resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the
international obligations of the United States.2 12
Unsurprisingly, the Space Act was passed in response to urging by
private companies, who were seeking legislative certainty that their business
plans would pass legal muster.2 13 The Act nevertheless specified in a
"Disclaimer of Extraterritorial Sovereignty"-seemingly passed in order to
ensure the United States' compliance with its obligations in the Outer Space
Treaty-that "by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not
thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction
over, or the ownership of, any celestial body." 2 14 It also maintained a caveat,
conferring rights to asteroid resources so long as they are obtained "in
accordance with applicable law," explicitly to include international law.215
If international law in fact prohibits commercial mining and use of outer
space resources, then the caveat may swallow the rule. Thus, the Act offers
210. Id. at art. 31 ¶3(c); see, e.g., AUST, supra note 76, at 244 (noting that "[i]n interpreting today
a reference in a treaty of, say, 1961 to the continental shelf, it would be necessary to consider not only
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, but also the much more up-to-date provisions on
the same subject in the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (UNCLOS)"); see also Richard Gardiner, The
Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 475, 499
(Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) ("[E]volutionary or evolutive interpretation has largely overtaken attempts
to align principles of interpretation with the difficult formulation of an 'intertemporal rule."');
GARDINER, supra note 73, at 290-334 (collecting sources).
211. Randolph, supra note 173, at45.
212. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 51303, 129 Stat.
704,721 (2015).
213. Randolph, supra note 173, at 44.
214. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act § 403.
215. Id. § 51303.
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some evidence that the United States interprets the Outer Space Treaty to
permit commercial mining, but with some persistent ambiguity.
Luxembourg followed the United States with its own legislation
conferring rights on private parties to space resources. The "Draft Law on
the Exploration and Use of Space Resources," passed in 2017, asserts baldly
that "[s]pace resources are capable of being appropriated." 2 16 The law also
creates a detailed legislative regime aimed at space resource exploitation.217
Just as with the U.S. legislation, the Luxembourg law was aimed at creating
legal certainty for companies and investors, and, as a result of the
legislation, Luxembourg has indeed successfully attracted private sector
space business.21 8 The Luxembourgian legislation is less ambiguous than
the U.S. legislation, as it does not include the caveat that commercial
appropriation of state resources must be obtained "in accordance with ...
the international obligations of' Luxembourg.2 19 Indeed, the Luxembourg
law includes explicit implementing regulations to govern the process of
private appropriation of space resources.2 20
The United States and Luxembourg are the only two nations that have
legislation on commercial appropriation of space resources. But they are not
the only states with relevant treaty practice. For example, reactions of other
nations to these laws is also relevant. In particular, the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS") and its Legal
Subcommittee have considered whether to explicitly respond to the new
laws in the United States and Luxembourg. While some national delegates
to the Legal Subcommittee (including, predictably, delegates from the
United States) have asserted that national legislation on space resources is
"consistent with . . . international obligations under the Outer Space Treaty
and with half a century of practice under the Treaty,"2 21 others have
disagreed. For example, the Russian Federation has made submissions to
COPUOS accusing the United States of "total disrespect for international
law order [sic]" by adopting the Commercial Space Launch
216. Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur I'exploration et l'utilisation des ressources de l'espace [Law of 20
July 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHE DE
LUXEMBOURG [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG], No. 674-1.
217. See Randolph, supra note 173, at 45 (reporting that the law "goes into great detail about the
authorization process, including establishing the need to receive ministerial authorization for space
exploration and resource use, the factors to be considered in granting the authorization, a requirement
for a risk assessment and regular audits, and fee ranges").
218. See id. (noting that since the law was passed, DSI has established its European headquarters
in Luxembourg and the country has formed a partnership with Planetary Resources).
219. Id. at 44, 45.
220. Id. at 45.
221. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Sixth
Session, if 221-50, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1122 (Apr. 18, 2017).
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Competitiveness Act, and by its stated approach to the use of the Moon's
natural resources.222
D. Attributed Lawmaking
The theory of attributed lawmaking suggests another form of state
practice exists. Specifically, when private commercial entities advance
interpretations of ambiguous provisions in the Outer Space Treaty and act
on them, those private entities, too, define the meaning of the treaty's terms.
To review, this is because while only nation-states who are treaty parties
have the authority to generate subsequent treaty practice, nations are under
an obligation to supervise and regulate the activity of their nationals in
space. That private sector activity is in fact attributed to the state as
"national" activity under the Outer Space Treaty:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in
conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.223
Nations may also be responsible for some of the activities of private
actors in space under the background rules of international law, even aside
from their commitments in the Outer Space Treaty, but making that
argument would require establishing that the private actors are, for example,
exercising governmental functions, as noted previously in Part I.C. Because
the Outer Space Treaty stipulates that private activities are national
activities that are attributed to states, however, the attribution question does
not require falling back on the background customary rules of attribution.
Because the activities of private actors are attributed to home nations,
those activities count among the evidences of "state practice" relevant both
to treaty interpretation and to the formation of customary international law
capable of filling treaty gaps. In particular, when private entities launch
rockets intended to exploit outer space resources, extract those resources,
and ultimately to sell them, they contribute to the development of a treaty
222. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Sci. & Tech. Subcomm. Reviewing
Opportunities for Achieving the Vienna Consensus on Space Security Encompassing Several Regulatory
Domains: Working Paper Submitted by the Russian Federation, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.1/2016/CRP.15 (Feb. 16, 2016); see also Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Rep. on Its Sixtieth Session, IT 227-37, U.N. Doc. A/72/20 (June 27, 2017) (recording this
disagreement).
223. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. Vl. The provision goes on to state that "[t]he
activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty." Id.
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interpretation that sanctions commercial exploitation of outer space
resources. This is not to say that this will be a winning argument at the
moment; commercial exploitation of outer space resources is currently at an
early stage. Moreover, the number of treaty parties who have commercial
entities engaged in developing a resource extraction business-and thus for
whom one can potentially marshal attributed state practice-is still small.
Nevertheless, the point is that as commercial plans and activity unfold, this
argument will become increasingly available.
The next subsections review the status of commercial plans and activities
in outer space before evaluating the strength of the arguments that these
plans and activities constitute attributed lawmaking now or in the future as
they continue to develop.
1. Commercial Space Companies Offer Interpretations
Commercial space enterprises assert that the Outer Space Treaty does
not prohibit mining and commercial use of resources on asteroids and the
Moon. As this Section will describe, space companies have been making
these assertions explicitly, by lobbying at national and international fora,
and also implicitly, by securing billions of dollars of investment money and
building businesses around the prospect that their preferred interpretations
will prevail.
Testimony in the U.S. Congress offers an example of ways private
companies are making assertions in public fora to defend their preferred
rules about space resource mining. This is because, as the U.S. government
has grappled with a variety of questions related to "new space" (a term used
to refer to the new commercial interest in outer space activities),2 24
committees of both houses of Congress have held hearings in which they
solicited corporate views. Heads of commercial space enterprises have used
these opportunities to share their plans, including plans for mining of lunar
and asteroid resources. For example, at a Senate hearing in 2017, Robert
Meyerson, the President of Blue Origin, stated that the company's "near-
term goal is to compete in the commercial market .... We are building the
next generation of transportation infrastructure: reliable, affordable,
frequent rides to space for everything from . . . resource mining to
microgravity manufacturing."22 5 George Whitesides, the CEO of Galactic
224. See, e.g., Partnerships to Advance the Business of Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Sci. & Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 8 -14 (2013) (statement of
Patti Grace Smith, Principal, Patti Grace Smith Consulting, LLC).
225. Reopening the American Frontier: Reducing Regulatory Barriers and Expanding American
Free Enterprise in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space, Sci., & Competitiveness of the S.
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Ventures, noted that his companies "are a part of a robust and growing
domestic commercial space industry.. . . made up of companies with private
financial backing working on a myriad of missions . . . [including] asteroid
mining, lunar landers, and in-space habitats. The commercial space industry
is well underway and poised to continue its growth." 226
Similarly, at a 2017 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Space,
the CEO of the privately funded commercial space company Moon Express
reviewed an array of plans the company has made to engage in collection of
lunar resources.2 27 Bob Richards stated that the company was formed to
"unlock the resources of the Moon through a progressive series of
commercial robotic missions." 228 Richards explained to the House why the
Moon is of commercial interest229 and how his company intends to exploit
that opportunity.230 The CEO outlined plans for three lunar expeditions,
concluding with a "sample return . . . with a goal of proving out the
technologies and legal premise of the first privately obtained lunar soil and
rocks." 231 That third expedition, titled "Harvest Moon," is intended to
"begin[] [the company's] business phase of lunar resource prospecting and
harvesting. The samples brought back will be the only privately obtained
lunar materials on Earth, and will be used to benefit science as well as
commercial purposes." 2 3 2
In addition to outlining plans that depend upon a permissive legal
environment toward commercial use of space resources, the private sector
leaders advanced their position that the Outer Space Treaty is currently
compatible with these plans. For example, a U.S. Senate hearing included a
pitch by the president of Bigelow Aerospace to update the Outer Space
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. 13 (2017) (statement of Robert Meyerson, President,
Blue Origin).
226. Id. at 17-26 (statement of George Whitesides, CEO, Galactic Ventures).
227. Private Sector Lunar Exploration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the H. Comm.
on Sci., Space, & Tech., I15th Cong. 23-35 (2017) (statement of Bob Richards, Founder & CEO, Moon
Express, Inc.).
228. Id. at 23. Richards stated, with a degree of dramatic flair, that:
The American flag is returning to the surface of the Moon next year, not because of a
government program but because of private sector investments into low-cost rockets and smart
robotic explorers that are collapsing the cost of lunar access. Together, we will begin a new
democratized program to make the Moon accessible to entrepreneurs.
Id. at 24.
229. Id. at 26 (explaining that the moon "has been enriched with vast resources through billions
of years of bombardment by asteroids and comets," and "these resources are largely on or near the lunar
surface, and therefore relatively accessible").
230. Id. ("Moon Express is blazing a trail to the Moon to seek and harvest these resources . ...
All Moon Express expeditions will prospect for materials on the Moon as candidates for economic
development and in-situ resource utilization.").
231. Id. at 27.
232. Id. at 28.
2019] 465
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Treaty to explicitly accommodate mining. The president nevertheless
affirmed his understanding that this update would merely clariy what he
believed to be the correct interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.
Significantly, the company's president offered his opinion that the updates
would not be "inconsistent with most of the language provided in the
Treaty."23 3 However, the updates would help establish the rights of lunar
mining companies to engage in their proposed ventures:
It's very difficult to not want [updates to the Outer Space Treaty]
if you're a company that is promoting mining. You're going to spend
large amounts of money, risk people's lives, and you don't have some
security of a geographical definition. You're not asking for
ownership of the property, but ownership of what you extract in situ
from that area.
So I think this is not inconsistent. The 1967 Treaty provides for-
that each signatory to that Treaty needs to prepare methods of their
own within each country of how they are going to behave to carry out
the spirit. of that Treaty, which is that all foreign bodies should be
used in the interest of the common welfare of mankind. That doesn't
exclude free enterprise by any means....
So I don't see any kind of discontinuity. The Treaty provides for
these kinds of things because it leaves it up to sovereign countries to
make these decisions, but it also could be updated. The risk of that is
trying to get a consensus where you would actually be able to get a
large population of countries to agree, I think. 2 34
The company's president is asserting his view that the treaty does not
prohibit private commercial activities and confirming his company's plans
to engage in them.
233. Reopening the American Frontier: Reducing Regulatory Barriers and Expanding American
Free Enterprise in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space, Sci., & Competitiveness of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. 40 (2017) (statement of Hon. Tom Udall, U.S. Sen.
from New Mexico).
234. Id. at 41. Bigelow also stated his opinion that the treaty did not anticipate commercial
activities on the moon:
I think that that Treaty was cast in a time-frame where the United States and Russia didn't know
who was going to be reaching the Moon first. There were concerns about proprietary
possession, ownership of different ... asset[s] of the Moon. So the philosophy was different
than today.
It was un-thought of at that time, I'm assuming, that commercial folks would have the





In a hearing in the House of Representatives, John Thornton, CEO of
Astrobotic Technology, Inc., also defended the legality of his company's
plans, but walked a fine line to do so. On the one hand he asserted that the
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act offers sufficient legal
certainty for companies seeking to proceed with lunar mining, but on the
other hand he acknowledged that the U.S. legislation is "creating" norms
that may potentially cause international conflict. Thornton engaged in a
colloquy with Representative Ed Perlmutter from Colorado:
Mr. PERLMUTTER. And I guess my concern ... is .. . we're
talking about mining, we're talking about taking resources, so, is
there title? Is somebody jumping somebody else's claim? Exactly
how do you see this working? ....
Mr. THORNTON. So in our view, the Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act of 2015, currently that's sufficient for where
we're at. We don't view that as a barrier for development or
investment or partners to even invest or send payloads in the
resources realm. So currently, we don't see the strong push for
additional change at the moment.
It's also reassuring that the government of Luxembourg recently
had a similar thing where they could say that Luxembourg companies
could own the rights for resources. So we're starting to see
international
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Activity?
Mr. THORNTON. -activity, and then also agreement with the
norms that the United States is creating.235
That exchange led to an even more explicit pitch by Bretton Alexander,
Blue Origin's Director of Business Development and Strategy. Alexander
affirmed industry's "interpretation" of the Outer Space Treaty, but also
implicitly recognized that this U.S. private sector interpretation could be an
international outlier, and urged the U.S. government to affirm it with foreign
counterparts:
I think it's important for the U.S. government through the State
Department to be talking internationally with its counterparts,
particularly in the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
235. Private Sector Lunar Exploration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the H. Comm.
on Sci., Space, & Tech., 115th Cong. 76 (2017).
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about what the Space Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, allows and how
we're interpreting that. It's important for us as an industry to have the
certainty that comes with, like you said, with the 2015 law but also
that it's founded in the Outer Space Treaty, which basically say[s]
that those resources are available to everybody so that when we go,
let's say, to the Moon and discover water ice there, we're not saying
now we own every piece of resource on the Moon and every bit of
water ice on the Moon; we're saying, you know, we are able to utilize
what we are able to extract and be able to sell that and have property
rights over that but not rights to the entire Moon. So I think it's
important from a government perspective that we go out and explain
what our interpretation of the treaty is and the framework that we're
establishing and lead by example.2 36
The argument these companies are making is that they are on solid legal
footing in their appropriation-permissive interpretation of the Outer Space
Treaty, though they would prefer that the U.S. government take a more
proactive role in asserting this interpretation internationally.
These examples of assertions of beliefs made by U.S. companies before
the U.S. Congress are not comprehensive, but simply illustrative. There is
certainly at least implicit evidence that companies have pressed their cases
before foreign governments as well. For example, as previously discussed,
the Virgin Group obtained a $1 billion commitment from Saudi Arabia
(though the Virgin Group does not focus its agenda on mining) and
Planetary Resources was able to obtain a substantial investment from the
government of Luxembourg for its asteroid mining business.
In addition to offering assertions about the meaning of international
treaty law, private sector entities from diverse nations have also engaged in
"practice." That is, they have built business models and secured massive
amounts of funding to begin projects that depend on their preferred
interpretations of international law being adopted by the international
community. Indeed, some of these companies are beginning to send
missions to space in 2019, as this Article goes to print.
U.S. companies are again leaders in this space. As the testimony to
Congress reviewed above shows, Moon Express has publicized its intention
to "prospect for materials on the Moon as candidates for economic
development and in-situ resource utilization." 2 3 7 The company has concrete
plans to return samples from the moon as soon as 2020.238 Planetary
236. Id.
237. Id. at 26.
238. See id. at 27.
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Resources intends to mine asteroids, beginning with a prospecting mission
to a near-Earth asteroid in 2020.239 The company intends to extract asteroid
water, selling hydrogen and oxygen to other space missions, and ultimately
to extract platinum and other precious metals.2 40 Planetary Resources has
attracted substantial early investment by "Larry Page, co-founder of
Google, [] Charles Simonyi, a former chief software architect at Microsoft
... [and] the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg." 2 4 1 The company deployed a
demonstration satellite from the international space station in 2015, and in
2018 launched another satellite containing a "demonstration of technology
designed to detect water resources in space." 2 42
Moving beyond U.S. companies, the Israeli company SpacelL's
attempted Beresheet moon lander mission is another example. SpacelL
launched a lander atop SpaceX's Falcon 9 rocket in spring 2019. While the
mission was unsuccessful, as the lander ultimately crashed on the moon, the
mission represented the fourth country to send a robotic lander to the moon,
following the United States, former Soviet Union, and China. Most
importantly the attempted moon landing was the very first to be entirely
privately-funded. While Beresheet's mission did not include mining for
space resources, the lander was to engage in activities intended to lay a
foundation for later mining.243
Other companies have even more ambitious plans. Tokyo-based "private
lunar exploration" company iSpace plans to "locate, extract, and deliver
lunar ice to space agencies and private space companies." 2 4 4 As a first step,
the company is developing a mission called "HAKUTO-R." 24 5 The mission
has two phases, first to orbit the moon in mid-2020, then to land a rover in
mid-2021.246 The company has seven more missions planned after that,
including missions to look for water in the Moon's Polar Regions. 24 7
239. Kenneth Chang, If No One Owns the Moon, Can Anyone Make Money Up There?, N.Y.




242. Timeline, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://www.planetaryresources.com/company/timeline/
[https://perma.cc/3QRR-ASRR]. Planetary Resources began to face resource shortages in 2018 due to
the instability of property rights in outer space. See Foust, supra note 6 (noting that financing approaches
used in terrestrial mining "rely on secured mineral rights that don't exist for extraterrestrial bodies").
243. Kenneth Chang, After SpaceX Launch, Israeli Spacecraft Begins Journey to the Moon, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/science/spacex-launch-israel.html [https:/
/perma.cc/NX9W-SU8N].
244. Jamie Carter, A Japanese Startup is Set To Go Huntingfor Ice ... On the Moon, TECHRADAR
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According to an iSpace spokesperson, the company wants "to identify
where water ice exists and map that out so that we can eventually learn how
to use it as a resource . . . . Technically speaking this is about developing a
way of separating the Moon's water ice into hydrogen and oxygen to create
basic rocket fuel for spacecraft." 2 4 8 iSpace has already raised $95 million to
fulfil these goals and has already secured launch space on SpaceX
rockets. 2 4 9 The company has also secured major funding partners such as
Japan Airlines, and partnerships with other private companies in Japan such
as NGK Spark Plug (which wants to develop solid-state battery technology
for the moon), Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance company (which has announced
a lunar insurance service), and KDDI (a telecom operator with plans to
provide communications between the earth and the moon). 25 0 The
HAKUTO-R mission is explicitly intended to "kick-start a new commercial
space industry" by laying critical groundwork for activities of other private
companies on the moon.2 51
A UK startup called the Asteroid Mining Corporation (AMC) seeks "to
extract resources from asteroids to boost the Earth's economy and kick start
the Space Based Economy."25 2 The young company headed by ambitious
millennials has plans to "prospect the near-Earth asteroids ... for mining
candidates." 25 3 The company then intends to "commercialise this data set in
order to fund further development of the Asteroid Mining industry" using
the revenues from the database to focus R&D on "extraction, processing
and utilisation of the available extra-terrestrial materials."2 54 AMC claims
that its business model is realistic: its incremental goal is to disseminate
information of value to other entrants in the commercial asteroid mining
space before ultimately gathering resources to engage in extraction itself.2 5 5
The company is currently seeking investors and lobbying in the UK for
introduction of legislation clarifying private rights over outer space





252. Our Values, ASTEROID MINING CORP., https://asteroidminingcorporation.co.uk/our-vision
[https://perma.cc/4RVE-SMBS].







2. Assessing the Evidence
The attributed lawmaking theory identifies a potential argument that the
behavior catalogued in this Section should count as state practice relevant
to treaty interpretation and potentially also to forming customary rules that
can fill in any gaps in the governing treaties. That is, to the extent that the
Outer Space Treaty's key terms, like "appropriation," are ambiguous,
subsequent practice can help define their meaning. To the extent that the
Outer Space Treaty is silent on commercial appropriation, customary
international law can supply missing terms. Private activity can be relevant
to both inquiries as attributed state practice.257
To determine that relevant "subsequent practice" defines an Outer Space
Treaty term for the purpose of Article 31 paragraph 3(b) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, one would need to show substantial
agreement among all 107 parties. At a minimum, one would need to show
tacit agreement.258 This is a high threshold that will not likely be easy to
reach. Nevertheless, even a limited amount of state practice, from even a
much more limited number of states, can help "confirm the meaning" or
resolve an ambiguous meaning, pursuant to Article 32.259 In both cases,
attributing private behavior to nations for the purpose of treaty practice
broadens the range of state practice that is relevant to interpreting the Outer
Space Treaty. The evidence likely does not yet permit a strong argument
that attributed practice definitively resolves the debate over commercial
appropriation. Rather, the point is that (1) state practice is an under-
examined body of evidence and should be considered alongside the text of
the Outer Space Treaty as a relevant means of determining what
international law requires; (2) the activities of private entities are relevant
to this analysis as attributed state practice; and, finally, (3) the activities of
private entities have been pushing states consistently toward endorsing the
legality of commercial exploitation of outer space resources. If this trend
continues, it will likely lead at some point to the emergence of a customary
international law rule that is permissive toward that commercial use.
The implication of the fact that private practice should count among
sources of state practice for the purposes of law formation is that private
257. This is not to say that the analysis would be the same for each type of state practice. The
threshold for finding "subsequent practice" relevant to treaty interpretation is lower in the sense that one
must only look at the behavior of parties, whereas custom requires a sufficient universality of practice.
In this circumstance, however, a court would hypothetically need to find substantial agreement among
all 107 parties to the Outer Space Treaty. Courts often find the existence of a customary rule with
evidence of practice and opinio juris from a much smaller universe of nations.
258. See discussion supra Part 1.B.2.
259. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying discussion.
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actors can become formally sanctioned international lawmakers in this
realm.260
The space law case study also describes an instance where private parties
put governments in reactive positions, forcing governments to legislate, if
at all, in reaction to private behavior, once that private behavior has set the
ground rules or changed the status quo. Thus, the space law example shows
how private entities make uncodified law not only formally, through
attributed custom, but also informally, through nudging governments
toward their preferred rules. Consider the case study: nations are responsible
for ensuring that private parties comply with the non-appropriation
principle, whatever its meaning. If, hypothetically, the non-appropriation
principle means that private parties may not engage in commercial mining
activities on asteroids and the moon, nations are responsible for "assuring"
that private companies within their jurisdiction and control do not conduct
these activities. If private parties act in contravention of that treaty
requirement, nations are responsible to ensure that those entities stop doing
so; nations must "offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition."21 By moving forward with plans to commercially exploit outer
space resources, private entities make it more and more difficult for states
to comply with that requirement, increasing the chance that the prohibition
on non-appropriation will come to be interpreted permissively, or will fall
into desuetude and be replaced by a permissive customary international
legal rule. Thus, by openly acting in a way that assumes a certain treaty
interpretation, private actors are in the process of nudging, cajoling, or
forcing states to engage in behavior that converts the private sector's
preferred treaty interpretations into law. In a realpolitik sense then, in
addition to a doctrinal one, state behavior is a product of acts by private
actors for whom the nation is responsible.
The space law case study thus shows how private actors can force the
development of uncodified international law on two levels. On a doctrinal
level, in the narrow instances when private conduct is attributed to the state,
the private behavior itself becomes state practice that can inform the
meaning of a treaty or the development of customary international law.
260. One could also plausibly argue that private entities are forcing the development of opinio
juris. The argument is that nations are aware of the assertive campaign by private actors to offer
interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty that would permit them to make commercial use of outer space
resources. Nations are fully capable of correcting these interpretations. To the extent they do not, one
might deduce that they agree with those interpretations. Because those nations have committed to
regulating their private sector entities according to the requirements of the Outer Space Treaty, this
argument assumes that their failure to do so flows from a good faith belief that those private sector
entities are not violating the law. Such a belief constitutes the opinio juris element. An alternative
account for states' failure to regulate could, of course, be their disinclination to enforce the Outer Space
Treaty, and so the argument is a reach because it assumes good faith.
261. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 18, at art. 30(b).
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Descriptively, this argument is important not just because it is plausible, but
because it can be used as a tool in the hands of those who would argue for
a commerce-friendly rule. On a realpolitik level, those private actors can
nudge the law toward their preferred interpretations by simply acting as
though their preferred rules were already law. Because states make
uncodified law by actual practice and belief, rather than a process of
multilateral lawmaking, private entities can place states in reactive postures,
greatly increasing the likelihood that their chosen rules will prevail. On this
second level-the level of lawmaking by nudge-private entities make law
even beyond the narrow instance when private conduct is attributed to the
state.
III. PUZZLES AND PAYOFFS
The theory of attributed lawmaking holds the potential to intervene in a
deeply significant debate over allocation of rights and the potential for
commercial gain in outer space, as the previous Part has argued. On a more .
fundamental level, the theory reads together and rationalizes the disparate
international legal doctrines of attribution and the rules of uncodified
lawmaking: custom formation and treaty interpretation. That rationalization
focuses attention on behavior by private sector entities-particularly
business actors-that has underappreciated lawmaking implications. This
Part pans out beyond the narrow context of space law to expose those
broader implications, and to address potential critiques and questions the
theory raises. It asks what potential impact the theory may have on
uncodified international law, what the theory means for the doctrine of
attribution, and what are the normative consequences of lawmaking by
private entities.
A. Critiques and Open Questions
There are a number of potential objections. I will take them in turn.
1. Is the Theory Constitutive?
A reader may object that the theory of attributed lawmaking, while
professing to merely rationalize existing legal doctrines, in fact reflects a
normative intervention. That is, perhaps the theory suggests a progressive
development of international law, rather than describing how it currently
functions. By doing so, the critique would assert, the theory of attributed
lawmaking could push international law toward an outcome of particular
concern to those who seek to restrain the influence of corporate entities. In
particular, amid concerns of corporate lobbying that may be detrimental to
2019] 473
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
public goods, these critics may fear yet another potential avenue of private
sector influence.
The concern is not entirely misplaced. The theory is meant to be
descriptive, yet even description can have a constitutive effect. To clarify,
it must be true that articulating the terms, parameters, or potential uses of a
legal doctrine can facilitate use of it. However, drawing attention to this
potential argument could also help officials anticipate it. Because the theory
clarifies the law-making consequences of state responsibility for private
sector activity, it also facilitates responses by nations. They can either
proactively regulate domestically or internationally in a way that avoids
these law-making consequences, or trump those consequences with clear
evidence of state practice or opinio juris.
For example, in the space law context, the argument is not that private
sector activity has fully resolved an interpretive debate or developed a
customary rule through the doctrine of attributed lawmaking, and, therefore,
that we now have a clear answer to the question about private appropriation
of space resources. Rather, the assertion is more modest: private sector
activity is relevant evidence when determining whether such a rule has
emerged. It is useful to highlight this evidence because governments that
may object to it now know that the onus is on them do so. These
governmental objections will also be relevant to the emerging interpretation
or rule and could bar the emergence of the rule for which private actors are
advocating.
2. What Is the Value of a Positivist Doctrinal Theory?
The paper has so far identified a plausible doctrinal argument that rests
on purely positivist, formalist modes of reasoning. This may strike some
readers as oddly retrograde, especially in light of the influence of recent
social science-inflected literatures in international law that depart from
purely positivist accounts.262 For example, the doctrine of sources that
elevates custom and its constituent elements has been critiqued as
artificially constraining, and as out of touch with the factors that actually
explain the behavior of states.2 63 Theories of law that rely on formal
262. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2012) (reviewing literature).
263. See generally d'Aspremont, supra note 86 (critiquing the doctrine of sources and the two-
element version of customary international law as artificial constructions); Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate
Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 977, 977-78
(2011) (critiquing "ahistorical assumptions," the erroneous conclusion that customary international law
is created only by states, and the "false and inhibiting myth" of "state-oriented positivism"); Bodansky,
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hierarchies of lawmaking authority under classic conceptions of state
sovereignty do not describe the way norms actually acquire binding force,
or succeed in altering conduct, this critique asserts.2 64
The classic doctrine of sources nevertheless remains the lingua franca of
international lawyers, and so this Article's argument surfaces and engages
with the kind of doctrinal arguments that may be used in practice. After all,
international lawyers, judges, and officials rely on formalist modes of
reasoning in developing arguments about what customary international law
requires or proscribes.
3. Is Space Law an Isolated Case?
A critic might reasonably ask whether the space law case study is unique,
or whether the theory of attributed lawmaking also applies in other contexts.
Indeed, the space law context is unusual, and it is unusual in a way that
makes the analysis more straightforward. Specifically, the Outer Space
Treaty unambiguously stipulates that private conduct in outer space is
attributed to nations. Things get more complicated in contexts where
attribution is more ambiguous. But doctrinal murkiness does not preclude
the application of the lawmaking function this paper has described; it simply
complicates the analysis and leaves more room for contestation. Indeed, the
theory of attributed lawmaking clarifies the consequences of the doctrine of
attribution in a way that should encourage states to clarify the parameters of
that doctrine, as the next Section explains.
B. Implications for the Law ofAttribution
The theory focuses attention not just on the significance of a nation's
responses or non-responses to private sector acts for which it is responsible,
but also on the importance of clarifying the doctrine of attribution. As noted
earlier, the questions of what actors are properly counted "organs" or
"agents," what constitutes a "governmental function," or how much
direction and control is necessary for attribution, are not entirely
straightforward.2 65 The area is governed by customary international law,
supra note 50, at 111 (noting "a divergence between the traditional theory of customary law, which
emphasizes consistent and uniform state practice, and the norms generally espoused as 'customary"').
264. See sources cited supra note 263.
265. See Bodansky & Crook, supra note 19, at 782 ("The degree to which states should be held
responsible for conduct involving private actors is an increasingly significant contemporary issue, as
nonstate actors such as Al Qaeda, Somali warlords, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental
organizations play greater international roles, and as governments privatize some traditional functions
and enter into a variety of public-private collaborations with international organizations and private
actors."); Richard B. Lillich, Attribution Issues in State Responsibility, 84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. Proc. 51,
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which does not offer the clarity of a written agreement. Moreover, the
International Law Commission's attempt to reconcile the rules has
acknowledged weaknesses and ambiguities.266 The question has become
even less clear in recent years because of the growing diversity of corporate
types, and of the ways that states can have relationships with corporate
entities. 2 6 7 The spectrum of relationships stretches from entirely state-
owned enterprises performing governmental functions, which clearly count
as agents or organs of the state, to corporations in which a state has a small
stake through shares of common stock or exercises some other limited form
of control.268
The outer boundary of attribution is ambiguous and contested. Exposing
the potential lawmaking implications of attribution offers nations an
additional reason to clarify the law. If, as the attributed lawmaking theory
suggests, the behavior of corporate entities can be attributed to nations for
the purpose of lawmaking, then it is important not only for the purposes of
state responsibility but also for law formation to understand exactly what is
attributed to the state. For example, if nations are responsible for human-
rights-flaunting corporate entities, or privacy-flaunting actors in cyber-
space, or military contractors who defy humanitarian norms, do those
private acts also become attributed to the state for the purposes of custom
formation? Nations could clarify the law of attribution by, for example,
taking multilateral steps with a treaty, declaration, or statements of
principles.
Short of international efforts to clarify the law of attribution, nations may
wish to alter their own behavior to avoid these lawmaking consequences.
For example, if nations do not wish to have the acts of private actors count
for the sake of lawmaking, this could chill substantial national ownership
stakes in private companies. Nations could, perhaps, choose to invest in
stock without control rights to clarify their lack of control over the private
51 (1990) ("The more one studies [attribution] ... the more he or she will find it to be one of the most
interesting and controversial areas of state responsibility and, indeed, of international law in general.");
see also Eichensehr, supra note 135 (noting complex attribution questions arising with respect to cyber
attacks).
266. As Daniel Bodansky points out, "[t]he Commission was well aware that the articles on
attribution sometimes suggest more precision or concreteness than is found in the world." Bodansky,
supra note 19, at 783. In collecting ambiguities, Bodansky notes that the Articles do not clarify, for
example, the meaning of "governmental authority," or when a private actor is "under a state's 'direction
or control."' Id.
267. See Wai, supra note 131, at 220 ("[I]nteractions between governmental and business actors
are multiple and intricate," featuring "complex ownership structure[s]" and a variety of situations where
"commercial interests overlap with governmental conduct").
268. See id. (reviewing blurring distinctions between state-owned and publicly or privately owned
corporations).
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entity. Alternatively, because the status of a private company as a nation's
"organ" or "agent" is determined under domestic law, nations could
legislatively clarify the substance of their relationships with private actors
to try to avoid attribution and its lawmaking consequences.
C. Implications of Corporate Lawmaking
The theory of attributed lawmaking focuses attention on a little-studied
corporate lawmaking phenomenon. While a substantial literature considers
how non-governmental actors influence or contribute to customary
international law, this literature has focused principally on contributions by
international organizations, NGOs, or groups that aspire to sovereignty.26 9
Conversely, literatures considering business contributions to international
lawmaking have not focused on uncodified international law like custom
and treaty interpretation. 2 70 The theory of attributed lawmaking thus
contributes to this literature and attempts to refocus it.
Business contributions to international custom formation suggest that
custom formation could suffer even greater legitimacy deficits than the
standard critiques of custom recognize. In the case of attributed state
practice, custom may potentially only derivatively reflect the intentions of
nation-states, and instead elevate private legal interpretations to the status
of law. This may be particularly worrisome to those who fear that the
structurally amoral nature of corporate governance may result in corporate
269. See DUMBERRY, supra note 26, at 119 n.12 (collecting literature). Moreover, while industry
and trade groups share features with classic NGOs, analyses of contributions by NGOs frequently do
not recognize that business element. See Durkee, supra note 47 (articulating this critique). For reviews
of the literature, see generally Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International
Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (2006); Peter J. Spiro, Essay, Accountingfor NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161
(2002). Some have recognized business influence through lobbying, see, e.g., TULLY, supra note 86, at
92 (focusing on corporate contributions to custom formation through lobbying efforts and
acknowledging that "the impact of non-state actors upon customary international law remains
'undertheorized.'), or investment arbitration, see, e.g., DUMBERRY, supra note 26, at 119 (examining
indirect influence of corporations on custom, considering whether they have direct influence through
investment arbitration, and ultimately concluding that they do not).
270. These accounts focus on private standard-setting, see, e.g., BOTHE & MATTLI, supra note 30
(reviewing delegation ofregulatory power to international private-sector standard setting organizations);
David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L.
547, 548-50 (2005) (describing the entrenchment of international regulatory standardization through
bureaucratic cooperation), participation in multi-stakeholder institutions or other public-private
partnerships, see, e.g., Abbott & Gartner, supra note 29 (examining multi-stakeholder structures);
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 29 (public-private mechanisms and projects); Benedict Kingsbury et al.,
The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15 (2005)
(conceptualizing this activity as administrative action), and lobbying of domestic officials responsible
for international policy, see generally Putnam, supra note 47 (theorizing that the negotiating behavior
of national leaders reflects the dual and simultaneous pressures of international and domestic political
games); see also Brewster, supra note 47, at 539 ("Governments may form treaties for many of the same
reasons that they enact statutes-to achieve domestic goals."); see also Benvenisti, supra note 28, at 170
(conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups).
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behavior that sacrifices public goods for the sake of profit margins. The
implications of business contributions to uncodified law could, moreover,
be more pernicious than in the context of contributions to written treaty law.
Written treaty law is necessarily the product of considered attention by
national delegates, whereas unwritten law can form through unconsidered
attrition. Elevating private sector interpretations to the status of law through
unconsidered attrition elevates the legal product of structurally amoral
market actors outside of any forum designed to surface potential concerns.
Nevertheless, business input is often useful when business entities offer
expertise, develop technical standards, or serve as essential stakeholders
whose acceptance will be necessary to a rule's success. In the context of
attributed lawmaking, the precise reason why business acts and beliefs
become relevant is because there is contestation over the meaning of a treaty
or the content of a customary international legal norm, suggesting an
important global regulatory gap. Perhaps business entities have useful
expertise. Or perhaps narrow financial interests will thwart public goals.
Whatever the substantive outcome, the theory of attributed lawmaking
clarifies the stakes of non-action by states. The lesson for those concerned
with corporate influence in custom formation is to encourage lawmaking
projects by nations that fill the regulatory gap. These projects could take the
form of international agreements, tighter national-level regulation of
corporate entities for which the state is responsible, or other acts and
statements that clearly reveal the state's opinion and practice for the
purposes of treaty interpretation or custom formation.
D. Beyond Doctrine: Private Common Law
This Article has so far described a formalist, doctrinally grounded theory
of attributed lawmaking by non-state actors, and a realpolitik observation
that non-state actors can influence lawmaking by nation states. This Section
sets aside those proposals to engage in a thought experiment: Perhaps
private activity should also be viewed as developing an alternate set of
common law norms that operates outside the universe of state-sanctioned
lawmaking. In other words, private actors are articulating norms that may
come to have legal valence not because those norms are produced by official
lawmakers, but simply because they are being articulated and publicized
and acted upon.
In the space law case study, private actors who are not formally
empowered as lawmakers are articulating norms that are serving a
functional normative purpose. Notably, the things private business entities
are doing in this space would count as the building blocks for customary
international legal norms, if the business entities were national entities. That
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is, they are generating bodies of "practice" by acting as though their
preferred interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty are-or will be-
binding law. They are also generating quasi-opinio juris by numerous
affirmations of the legality of that behavior in various fora. A formalist
would not call this custom (outside the context of the attributed lawmaking)
because the source of this state practice and opinio juris is private entities.
Nevertheless, the character of this behavior is identical to behavior we
would call law-creating in the context of states.
This account fits within contemporary accounts that eschew positivist
analysis. Instead of asking which legal doctrines identify law, one might ask
about what norms appear to be relevant to international behavior. Who is
responsible for generating these norms? How do they acquire normative
valence? For example, the New Haven School takes the approach that
international law is constituted by decision processes unconstrained by
classic tests of legality. 2 7 1 Global legal pluralism views law as a contest
between competing normative orders, which are both publicly and privately
generated.27 2 The theory of transnational legal ordering investigates the life
cycles of normative orders by asking about how they develop, disseminate,
"settle," and then "unsettle." 2 7 3 These accounts diverge from classic post-
Westphalian international legal theory by unseating the nation as the sole
progenitor of legal rules. In these accounts, private actors can take roles in
the generation and contest of normative orders, or their settlement, and
unsettlement, and so forth. These accounts also capture the descriptive
reality that it is often difficult to tell the difference between binding black
letter law and proposals about how law ought to be, 2 74 as many norms
operate on a "spectrum of binding force."275 Jos6 Alvarez observes that
international organizations, for example, "produce lots of post-modern or at
least post-positivist norms, outside the three traditional sources of
international law." 2 7 6
Viewed in this light, private norm-creating behavior in the space law
context could be creating the beginnings of a common law of its own. While
this form of common law is invisible under positivist tests, it may come to
have relevance to the behavior of nations in the way that law is intended to
271. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Commentary, The
New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 575 (2007) (offering a brief primer on the
New Haven School approach).
272. See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. Soc. SC. 243 (2009)
(reviewing literature).
273. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).
274. See ALVAREZ, supra note 99, at 597 ("[S]ome organizational products appear fated to remain
in a netherworld between lex lata and lex ferenda.").
275. Id. at 596.
276. Id.
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do. To put this another way, the private sector behavior in the space law
context offers a case study for two separate kinds of proposition. As the
majority of this Article has explored, it is a case study for black-letter law
formation and the attributed lawmaking theory: business entities are forcing
states to fill the interstices of settled space law through creating attributed
state practice or nudging states to react to their preferred rules. On another
level, it is a case study for private roles in law formation that function
outside the "on the books" rules about how law acquires its authority and
binding nature. On that second level, the case study could inform
sociological inquiries concerned with how international norms form and
acquire the kind of stickiness lawyers come to label as "law."2 77
In the end, the two ways of viewing the facts in the space law context
likely tell the same story through different lenses: they both explain how, if
one were to fast-forward 20 or 30 years and find an established customary
law of private appropriation in space, one might then look backwards and
find the roots of that law now, today, not just in the acts and beliefs of states,
but also in the behavior of private actors.
CONCLUSION
The twenty-first century context requires new forms of lawmaking, or
old ones, reinvigorated. It is exposing major geopolitical rifts that divide
former allies and make the possibilities for deep, binding international
agreements remote. At the same time, borderless problems need
international solutions. A flotilla of legal articles have considered new
forms of global governance. Much less has been said about new pressures
on the oldest form of international law: customary international law. This
Article suggests that any analysis of customary international law formation
is incomplete without recognizing corporate contributions. It has uncovered
the significance of those contributions through a theory of "attributed"
lawmaking.
The theory illustrates how established doctrines in international law that
are not usually considered together may be reconciled. Theories of
attribution are usually considered in the context of a state's responsibility,
or the law relating to what a state must do when a legal violation has
occurred. These theories are not usually considered for the purposes of law
formation. Similarly, literatures that consider how non-state actors
participate in forming customary international law often consider how those
277. See, e.g., Nigel D. White, Lawmaking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 559, 580 (Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd & Ian Johnstone eds., 2016) (rejecting
"inflexible allegiance to Article 38 of the International Court's Statute" which "fails to capture the vast
amount, range, and impact" of other forms of lawmaking).
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actors influence states, not how non-state behavior itself may become
relevant to law formation. Reading together doctrines of attribution, custom
formation, and treaty interpretation produces a result that has been neglected
in scholarship and practice, yet has important results.
As a doctrinal matter, private activity that is attributed to the state
becomes "state practice" for the purposes of interpreting a treaty or
gathering evidence of a new customary international legal rule. As a matter
of realpolitik, private actors standing in the shoes of the state can force states
into a reactive posture, easing their preferred rules into law through the
power of inertia and changes to the status quo. At bottom, the theory of
attributed lawmaking shows that when states delegate authority or
responsibility to private actors-when they allow those private actors to
stand in the shoes of the states for the purposes of duties-they also delegate
rights and privileges: in particular, the right and the privilege of making
international law.
The results can be striking. In space law, nations have failed to update
Cold-War-era treaties that do not conclusively resolve many questions
raised by the new space race. Companies like SpaceX and iSpace are filling
in the gaps. The implications might be unsettling. After all, the implications
of the theory could reach beyond space law to areas like human rights,
humanitarian law, cyberspace, and other areas where nations can bear legal
responsibility for corporate acts. Corporate lawmaking in these areas could
fill important lacunas, or it could threaten public goods. By uncovering
these possibilities, the Article invites affirmative lawmaking responses by
states. If the meaning and content of international law can be altered by
private commercial entities, then lawyers, scholars, and policymakers
concerned with diverse global problems should turn their attention to the
potential and peril of this private lawmaking activity.
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